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Chemical Trespass?-An Overview Of
Statutory And Regulatory Efforts To
Control Pesticide Drift*
By SARAH E. REDFIELD**
INTRODUCTION
Howard Clayton grew cotton on 840 acres of land located
across Boggy Bayou from the Kennedy property. The Kennedy
brothers sprayed their rice with 2,4-D, once aerially and once
by hand equipment. The Kennedys claimed that they did not
think that the herbicide would "drift"' more than sixty to seven-
ty five feet in the absence of wind. To avoid further drift, the
herbicide was applied in the late afternoon, on a calm day, and
the spray was cut off before the canal. Regardless of these
precautions, the herbicide drifted and damaged Clayton's cot-
ton.2
John Sullivan, a rice farmer, hired Burnett Flying Service to
spray his crop. Voyles' truck farm adjoined Sullivan's rice farm.
Voyles testified that he was in his field when Norman Burnett
started spraying, and that the wind was blowing from Sullivan's
* Much of the research reflected in this Article was undertaken under a contract
between Franklin Pierce Law Center and the Board of Pesticides Control of the State
of Maine.
** Professor of Law at Franklin Pierce Law Center, Concord, New Hampshire.
For the purpose of this Article, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
definition of "drift" is useful: "The term 'drift' means movement of a pesticide during
or immediately after application or use through air to a site other than the intended site
of application or use." 40 C.F.R. § 162.3(n) (1984). See also 40 C.F.R. § 162.3(aa)
(1984) which defines nontarget organisms as "those flora and fauna (including man)
that are not intended to be controlled, injured, killed or detrimentally affected in any
way by a pesticide."
I Clayton collected damages in negligence. See Kennedy v. Clayton, 227 S.W.2d
934 (Ark. 1950). See also Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Kennedy, 272 S.W.2d 685 (Ark. 1954)
(Kennedy's suit against seller).
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farm. The spray damaged Voyles' tomatoes, potatoes, squash,
and green beans.3
D.N. Schrock raised cantaloupes on eighty acres of land
abutting Crouse's cotton fields. Crouse was a customer of Wil-
bur-Ellis, a company which sold insecticides and also advised
customers on their use. In reliance on Wilbur-Ellis' observation
that his cotton was infested with lygus and stinkbugs and their
3 Voyles collected damages for negligence. See Sullivan v. Voyles, 462 S.W.2d
454 (Ark. 1971). See also, e.g., S.A. Heeb v. Prysock, 245 S.W.2d 577 (Ark. 1952)
(action by cotton farmers against rice farmer to recover for damage to cotton crops
when aviator sprayed rice crops in an allegedly negligent manner); Bums v. Vaughn,
224 S.W.2d 365 (Ark. 1949) (damage to cotton crops from chemical dust which defendant
had employed an airplane pilot to spray on defendant's rice crop); Augustine v. Dick-
enson, 406 So. 2d 306 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (property owners recover from flying service and
insurance company for damage to vegetable gardens and fruit trees from drift from
spraying of paraquat to kill grass in soybean field); Watkins v. Johnson, 606 S.W.2d
493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (damage to red clover from aerial application of 2,4-D to pasture);
Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 335 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), modified,
346 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1961) (action by cotton farmers against aerial spraying company
and ranch owner for damage to cotton crop allegedly caused by drifting of herbicide).
In cases like these the courts typically find spraying to be inherently dangerous and
thus extend liability to both the independent contractor and the employer. The rule was
well stated in a 1932 decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court where the court explained
an exception to the general rule that the employer is not liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor. S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 27 P.2d 678 (Ariz. 1933) (negligent
spraying of lettuce by independent contractor destroyed neighboring apiary). The court
noted that "the law will not allow one who has a piece of work to be done that is
necessarily or inherently dangerous to escape liability to persons or property negligently
injured in its performance by another to whom he has contracted such work." Id. at
680. Of particular interest was the court's application of the principle to pesticides' use:
"This is especially true where the agency or means employed to do the work, if not
confined and carefully guarded, is liable to invade adjacent property, or the property of
others, and destroy or damage it." Id. Specifically, the court found:
The defendant was within its legal rights in depositing the insecticide on
its lettuce fields for the purpose of ridding it of the worms ... but,
because of the very great likelihood of the poisonous dust or spray spread-
ing to adjoining or near-by premises and damaging or destroying valuable
property thereon, it could not delegate this work to an independent con-
tractor, and thus avoid liability.
Id.
See generally Emelwon, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied sub nom. Florida v. Emelwon, Inc., 393 U.S. 841 (1968); Boroughs v. Joiner,
337 So. 2d 340 (Ala. 1976); Copeland v. Hollingsworth, 535 S.W.2d 815 (Ark. 1976);
McKennon v. Jones, 244 S.W.2d 138 (Ark. 1951); Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson,
136 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Ark. 1946); Pannella v. Reilly, 23 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1939); Lawler
v. Skelton, 130 So. 2d 565 (Miss. 1961); Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 262 P.2d 231 (N.M.
1953); Frazier v. Moeller, 665 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983); Gragg v. Allen, 481
S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
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recommendation that the crop be sprayed with an insecticide
containing DDT (5%) and sulphur (7701o), Crouse proceeded to
have the insecticide applied. Within two days of the spraying
the entire neighboring cantaloupe crop was lost; expert testimony
established that the loss resulted from drift of the sulphur.4
Patrick and Dorothy Langan raised organic vegetables in
Washington. The insecticides Guthion and Thiodan were found
on their vegetables after their neighbors' fields were sprayed; as
a result the Langans lost their organic certification.5
Each of these fact patterns is excerpted from judicial opin-
ions dealing with damages caused by pesticide drift.6 Recovery
for such damage may be had under several legal theories7 in-
cluding negligence;" strict liability;9 and, occasionally, trespass °
4 Crouse settled with Schrock and then sought reimbursement from the flying
service and supplier. See Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 272 P.2d 352 (Ariz. 1954).
The Langans recovered under a theory of strict liability. See Langan v. Vali-
copters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977). See also Gotreaux v. Gary, 94 So. 2d 283
(La. 1957); Russell v. Windsor Properties, Inc., 366 So. 2d 219 (La. Ct. App. 1978);
Winston v. State Dept. of Highways, 352 So. 2d 752 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Young v.
Darter, 363 P.2d 829 (Okla. 1961); Bella v. Aurora Air, Inc., 566 P.2d 489 (Or. 1977);
Loe v. Lenhart, 362 P.2d 312 (Or. 1961).
6 There are other fact situations which bring pesticide concerns to the attention
of the courts. For example, some cases involve damage from direct spraying, where the
pilot fails to turn off the spray before flying over the adjoining land or where the
product is applied to the wrong site. See, e.g., Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson, 136
S.W.2d 484 (negligence where aerial spray of cotton not turned off in circling over
plaintiff's pasture). See also Bourg v. Cane Air, Inc., 325 So. 2d 738 (La. Ct. App.
1976) (spraying of plaintiff's land while crossing to intended site); Mustion v. Ealy, 266
N.W.2d 730 (Neb. 1978) (negligence found where plaintiff's pasture sprayed at time of
spraying neighboring cornfield); Cross v. Harris, 370 P.2d 703 (Or. 1961) (trespass found
where pilot mistakenly sprayed crops on the plaintiff's land).
7 The choice of legal doctrine is not so clear cut as a list might suggest. See Loe
v. Lenhart, 362 P.2d 312. See also Sigler, Controlling the Use of Pesticides, 15 J. PUB.
L. 311 (1966); Note, Regulation & Liability in the Application of Pesticides, 49 IoWA
L. REv. 135 (1963); Comment, Crop Dusting-Scope of Liability and a Need for Reform
in the Texas Law, 40 TEx. L. REv. 527 (1962). See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.3D 833
(1971); Annot., 12 A.L.R.3D 1103 (1967); Annot., 12 A.L.R.2o 436 (1950).
' See notes 2-4 supra. Cf. Cooper v. Peturis, 384 So. 2d 1087 (Aia. 1980)
(negligence not found where evidence showed defendant followed accepted aerial practice
while spraying the insecticide Banvel); Partridge v. Younghein, 277 N.W.2d 100 (Neb.
1979) (no showing that spray drift was proximate cause of damage to orchard); Ford v.
Shallowater Airport, 492 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (insufficient evidence to
prove drift caused illness); Gamblin v. Ingram, 378 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)
(jury verdict that herbicide not negligently applied upheld despite showing of damage to
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or nuisance." While litigation among private parties about var-
ious aspects of pesticide use is not uncommon, the issues raised
are also increasingly the subject of legislation 2 and concomitant
enforcement activities. 3
adjoining cotton); Stulls Chemicals v. Davis, 263 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)
(manufacturer not negligent).
9 See note 5 supra for cases applying strict liability. See also Israel, Comments
on Recent Important Aviation Cases, Aerial Spraying of Herbicides and Insecticides, 32
AM. TRuIL LAW. J. 733 (1968); Note, Cropdusting: Two Theories of Liability?, 19
HASTINGs L.J. 476 (1968); Note, Liability for Chemical Damage From Aerial Crop
Dusting, 43 MINN. L. Rav. 531 (1959); Note, Crop Dusting: Legal Problems in a New
Industry, 6 STAN. L. REv. 69 (1953).
10 See Schronk v. Gilliam, 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See also Lingle
v. Crawford County, 315 N.W.2d 814 (Iowa 1982); Chase v. Henderson, 509 P.2d 1188
(Or. 1973); Cross v. Harris, 370 P.2d 703; Dallas County Flood Control Dist. v. Fowler,
280 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). But see AIm v. Johnson Aviation Co., 275 P.2d
959 (Idaho 1964) (lack of evidence of damages); Wall v. Trogdon, 107 S.E.2d 757 (N.C.
1959) (causation not proved).
" While private nuisance has not been a prevalent theory of recovery for pesticide
damage it is occasionally discussed. See, e.g., Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 P.2d 1260
(Cal. Ct. App. 1937). More typically the theory of nuisance is ignored or rejected by
the court. See, e.g., Lingle v. Crawford, 315 N.W.2d 814; Gotreaux v. Gary, 94 So. 2d
293; Trotter v. Callens, 546 P.2d 867 (N.M. 1976).
11 A careful examination of pesticide litigation and its theory is not the basic
purpose of this Article. Legislation concerning pesticides, however, is sometimes used as
the standard of care in litigation between private parties. See, e.g., Wilson Farms, Inc.
v. Wallace, 590 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979) (violation of regulations of Arkansas
Plant Board considered in determining negligence); 335 S.W.2d at 629 (Texas standard
prohibiting spraying with wind greater than 10 miles per hour considered in finding
negligence where spraying occurred in wind of 18-21 miles per hour). See also Langan
v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 224. Statutory provisions may also be a procedural bar
to private litigation. See Stewart v. McArdle Flying Serv., 446 P.2d 379 (Okla. 1968).
See also Leonard Farms v. Thompson-Hayward Chem. Co., 568 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978) (Texas court construes Oklahoma statute to bar plaintiff's suit against
applicator, but not necessarily against seller and manufacturer). Accord Dowers Farms,
Inc. v. Lake County, 607 P.2d 1361 (Or. 1980) (notice provision of Oregon Tort Claims
Act construed in potato farmer's case in negligent trespass against county for herbicide
drift). But see Short v. Jones, 613 P.2d 452 (Okla. 1980); Cross v. Harris, 370 P.2d
703. But see also Malaer v. Flying Lion, Inc., 670 P.2d 214 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (whether
defendant is estopped from challenging adequacy of notice given by plaintiff-to exten-
sion agent rather than Department of Agriculture as required by statute-is a question
of fact precluding summary judgment); Christensen v. Midstate Aerial Applicators Corp.,
166 N.W.2d 386 (N.D. 1969) (statutory requirement of verified complaint not condition
precedent to action by person for whom chemical applied).
11 Increasingly, pesticide legislation and regulation is the basis of enforcement-
oriented litigation between the government and the violator. Occasionally such litigation
directly confronts the drift issue but more often other violations are the basis of the
enforcement effort. See, e.g., State v. St. Regis Paper Co., 432 A.2d 383 (Me. 1981).
St. Regis Paper Co., a procedural decision, describes the underlying lawsuit where the
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The United States Department of Agriculture statistics indi-
cate that over one billion pounds of pesticides are produced
annually for use in the United States. 14 It is believed to be
virtually impossible to apply pesticides without drift. Given this
usage and the inevitability of potential problems from drift, it
is not surprising that regulatory programs have been enacted at
all levels of government to attempt to control drift. 5 At least
one such approach sought to define and prohibit "chemical
trespass.' ' 6 Other legislative bodies have enacted other types of
standards.'7 While the basic concepts of the regulation of pesti-
cides are derived from the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),8 much of the legislative initiative to
control drift has evolved within the states and shows an impres-
sive variety in approach. 9
State of Maine sought civil penalties against St. Regis (the landowner) and Northeast
Helicopter Services, Inc., in a situation involving drift. For litigation involving violations
or potential violations of other aspects of pesticide regulation, see Oregon Envtl. Council
v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1983) (label provision to "avoid" breathing
of the insecticide carbaryl not violated by direct aerial application to residential area
where buffers, markers, pretreatment over-flights and notice used); United States v.
Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (use inconsistent with label
prohibition against application where water fowl known to feed repeatedly), aff'd, 578
F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978); State v. Courtney, 247 N.W.2d 714 (Wis. 1976) (violation of
Wisconsin regulations concerning disposal of pesticide containers); Perry Creek Cran-
berry Corp. v. Hopkins Agricultural Chem. Co., 139 N.W.2d 96 (Wis. 1966) (violation
of misbranding prohibition).
14 With regard only to those products for which information is available (and there
is no information available for many products), data from the Agriculture Stabilization
and Conservation Service indicates that 1,508,638,000 pounds of pesticides were produced
domestically, 1,469,000 pounds were imported and 546,825,000 pounds were exported.
U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 1983.
" See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
6 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 606.2G (1983) (repealed and replaced 1984). See
note 109 infra for the statute's revision. Although the Maine Legislature initially used
the words "chemical trespass," a review of recent judicial precedent indicates that the
trespass theory is infrequently used in pesticide litigation. See note 10 supra and accom-
panying text. For chemical trespass cases in general, see Renken v. Harvey Aluminum,
Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Or. 1963) (aluminum particles); Borland v. Sanders Lead
Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979) (lead particles and sulphur dioxide); Hall v. DeWeld
Micca Corp., 93 S.E.2d 56 (N.C. 1956) (silicon dioxide); Martin v. Reynolds Metals,
342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1959) (flouride gas and particulates).
See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R.4AT 1054 (1980).
17 See generally, Part II infra.
18 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, ch. 125, 61 Stat.
163 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k) [hereinafter cited as FIFRA].
'9 Because much of the regulation of pesticide drift is conceived at the state level,
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Consistent with the evolution of the law concerning drift,
this Article first describes the federal context for pesticide reg-
ulation and then reviews the state statutory and regulatory pro-
grams designed to control drift.20 Based on this review it is clear
that the essence of drift control regulation now lies within state
law. Given the often local nature of the concerns and problems
engendered by pesticide use, this state focus appears particularly
appropriate.
I. THE FEDERAL CONTEXT: A BRIEF REVIEW
Pesticides are regulated by both state and federal govern-
ments. 21 A review of the context and historical perspective in
which pesticide regulation has developed is useful in understand-
ing the scope of existing and potential state approaches to the
regulation of pesticide drift and off-target residues. This first
section of the Article describes the federal approach which, in
large measure, was the genesis and model for the state laws. 22
research for this Article required a review of both state statutes and state regulations,
the latter not being readily available from any single source. Codified statutes of the
fifty states and of several Canadian provinces were reviewed. Relevant regulations and
additional information were obtained by contacting pesticide control officials in each
state by telephone during November and December 1983, and January 1984. Once
regulations were received, two written confirmations were sent to each state: first, to
assure all current materials were referenced and cited, and second, to verify the excerpts.
All regulations cited here were current as of December 1983 and many as of April 1984.
As a general matter, the interviews and correspondence provided current data and yielded
some helpful information and observations about drift problems in the country; they
also showed a great diversity in perspective. In many states (e.g., Arkansas, Florida,
Montana and Texas) drift is perceived to be a major, if not the major, problem associated
with pesticide application. In other states, drift is either not a subject of particular
voiced concern, (e.g., Alaska, Minnesota and Nebraska) or is perceived to be adequately
regulated to obviate serious problems (e.g., Alabama). This same diversity was shown
in the agencies' enforcement approach.
2 It is important to note that the scope of this Article is limited. It does not
discuss the whole spectrum of federal and state law regarding pesticides; important
questions of registration, applicator certification and labeling are discussed only tangen-
tially. See generally notes 33-60, 71-80 infra and accompanying text. Similarly, the
evolution of judicial precedent dealing with pesticide drift is also discussed only in
reference to legislative and quasi-legislative approaches to the problem.
21 In some areas, local or county governments also play a role in pesticide regu-
lation, but this is not generally the case. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD & AGluc. CODE § 12977
(West 1968 & Supp. 1984). Federal law does not preempt the states in most instances.
See 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1980). In some instances state law has been held to preempt local
regulation. See, e.g., Town of Salisbury v. New England Power Co., 437 A.2d 281
(N.H. 1981). It appears that most states have not addressed the local preemption issue.
22 See generally U.S. ENrvL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DIG. OF STATE PESTICIDE USE
& APPLICATION LAWS (1976) [hereinafter cited as DIGEsT].
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The federal government began its involvement in pesticide
regulation in 1910 when it prohibited the manufacture or ship-
ment of adulterated products.?3 Originally enacted to prevent
consumer fraud in the marketing of these products, over time
the legislation has been amended to assert federal preeminence
in this regulatory field and to address the broader issues of the
impact of pesticides on health and the environment. 24
The current federal law is derived primarily from the 1947
enactment of FIFRA.25 FIFRA was intended to assure that pest-
icide products shipped in interstate commerce were unadulter-
ated, safely labeled and efficacious. 26 To achieve this objective,
FIFRA, as originally enacted, required the registration of eco-
nomic poisons27 and made distribution in interstate commerce
unlawful if the composition or the claims made for the products
differed from the assertions made in the registration process. 28
The criteria for registration under the original FIFRA were
simply that the composition of the product warranted the pro-
posed claims for it and that the labeling was accurate. 29
As a result of increasing public concern with the impact of
pesticides on the environment, FIFRA was extensively amended
" See Insecticide Act of 1910, repealed by FIFRA, ch. 125, § 16, 61 Stat. 163.
24 See note 25 infra.
- See 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k, amended by 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1980). FIFRA was
amended by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 136
(1980) [hereinafter cited as FEPCA]. Since 1972 FEPCA has been further amended by
Act of Dec. 18, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 903; Act of Nov. 28, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-104, § 9, 89 Stat. 754; Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, § 1,
92 Stat. 819; Act of Oct. 17, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-98, tit. V, § 509, 93 Stat. 695;
Federal Insecticide Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-539, 94 Stat. 3194; Act of Dec. 2, 1983,
Pub. L. No. 98-201, 97 Stat. 1379.
6 This purpose is elucidated in Continental Chemiste Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 461
F.2d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 1972).
- 7 U.S.C. § 135(a) (amended 1972) defined the term "economic poison" as
(1) any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroy-
ing, repelling, or mitigating any insects, rodents, nematodes, fungi, weeds
and other forms of plant or animal life or viruses, except viruses on or in
living man or other animals, which the Administrator shall declare to be
a pest, and (2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as
a plant regulator, defoliant or desiccant.
The current definitions of the terms "pesticide" and "pest" are similar, though reference
is added to "bacteria or other micro-organisms" not in living man or animals. See 7
U.S.C. §§ 136(u), 136(t) (1980).
See 7 U.S.C. § 135a (amended 1972).
See 7 U.S.C. § 135b (amended 1972). See also 7 U.S.C. § 135a (amended 1972).
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by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act (FEPCA)
of 1972.30 FEPCA extended registration requirements to pesti-
cides distributed in intrastate commerce,3' expanded the issues
to be considered prior to registration to explicitly include envi-
ronmental and health impacts, and generally increased the scope
of federal control of pesticide application.3 2
In broad terms, the current focus of FIFRA is threefold,
concerning itself primarily with product registration, product
labeling and pesticide applicators' certification. Within these
three categories, the federal regulation of pesticide use seldom
involves direct efforts to reduce or eliminate drift, although as
noted in the following discussion of each sphere of federal
legislation, reference to propensity to drift is not absent. 33
A. Registration
Although perhaps the least significant in terms of its actual
impact on the control of drift, the registration process, which
requires Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approval be-
fore a product can be distributed or used, is at the core of
FIFRA.14 The statutory35 criteria for pesticide registration require
findings by the EPA that the composition of the product is such
3 See note 25 supra.
1 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1980).
32 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D), 136x, 136b(b) (1980).
" In addition to a review of FIFRA and the Code of Federal Regulations, infor-
mation for this section was obtained from Richard W. King, Office of Pesticide Pro-
grams, EPA, in telephone interviews on Feb. 3 and May 30, 1984. Drift is now mentioned
in the EPA general worker protection standards: "No owner or lessee shall permit the
application of a pesticide in such a manner as to directly or through drift expose workers
or other persons except those knowingly involved in the applicaton. The area being
treated must be vacated by unprotected persons." 40 C.F.R. § 170.3 (1983).
See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1980).
31 Two additional standards are provided in regulations adopted by the EPA: (1)
a tolerance or exemption from the tolerance requirement of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FDCA], must have been
obtained where the product is proposed for use on food or where its intended use may
reasonably be expected to result in food residues; (2) if the product is a drug as well as
a pesticide, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must have notified the EPA that
the product complies with any applicable FDA requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 162.7(d)(2)(ii)(E)-
(F) (1984). Tolerances, intended to reflect the amount of pesticide residue which can
remain on a crop when it moves to market, are now set by the EPA. For a review of
the relationship of FIFRA to the FDCA in the context of DDT tolerances, see Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 428
F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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as to warrant the proposed claims for it; that the labeling is in
compliance with law; that the product will perform its intended
function without unreasonable adverse effects on the environ-
ment; and that the product, when used in accordance with
widespread and commonly recognized practice, will not generally
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. 6
In registering a pesticide, the EPA must also classify its use
as general, restricted or a combination of the two." Classification
is a method of limiting the extent of use of a product. A
restricted-use classification generally requires application only by
or under the direct supervision of a certified applicator or within
other specified conditions.3 8 The classification decision is de-
pendent upon the impact of the proposed applications on the
environment. Those products which, when applied in accordance
with the label or with the commonly accepted practice, will not
generally cause an unreasonable adverse impact on the environ-
ment are classified for general use.39 Those which, under the
same circumstances, may cause injury to the applicator or other
adverse impact are classified for restricted use. 40
In both registration and classification decisions environmen-
tal impact is a central statutory concern. The crucial term "un-
reasonable adverse effect on the environment" is defined in
FIFRA as "any unreasonable risk to man or the environment,
taking into account the economic, social, and environmental
M See 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)(c)(5) (1980). See also 40 C.F.R. § 162.7, .8, .10, .11
(1983). There are less restrictive criteria for certain conditional registrations and for
products of limited use. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(7), (c)(2)(A) (1980).
" See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d) (1980). The standards are explicitly defined by regulation
for new registrations in 40 C.F.R. § 162.11(c)(1) (1983) and for preexisting registrations
in 40 C.F.R. § 162.11(cX4) (1983). See also 40 C.F.R. § 162.31 (1983).
11 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(dX1)(C) (1980). Where the restricted classification is based
on a finding that toxicity presents a hazard to an applicator, the product may be applied
only by or under the direct supervision of a certified applicator. See 7 U.S.C. §
136a(d)(1)(C)(i) (1980). Where it is based on environmental hazard, other restrictions
may apply instead. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(1)(C)(ii) (1980). See also 7 U.S.C. § 136b
(1980) as to applicator certification.
See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(1)(B) (1980).
See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(1)(C) (1980). See also 40 C.F.R. § 162.2(c) (1983). The
EPA regulations mention drift in regard to classification by indicating that impact on
nontarget organisms will be considered whether the impact results "from exposure to
the product ingredients, their metabolites, or degradation products, whether due to direct
application or otherwise resulting from the application, such as through volatilization,
drift, leaching or lateral movement in soil." 40 C.F.R. § 162.11(c)(2)(iii)(D) (1983).
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costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.' '4 "Environment"
is defined to include "water, air, land, and all plants and man
and other animals living therein and the interrelationship which
exist among them." ' 42 These terms thus contain within them the
federal mandate to balance health and environmental effects with
efficacy and economic impact.
From the language of these definitions, it appears that a
product's propensity to drift could be grounds to limit use by
restrictive classification or to eliminate use by refusal to register.
According to the EPA, in considering registration, the Agency
has operated since 1976 under a "policy" of requesting the
submission of spray drift data in certain instances. 43 It was not
until October of 1984 that this policy was added to EPA regu-
lations,44 with spray drift data still being only conditionally
required. 45 It remains unclear what impact requesting such stud-
ies has had or will have on actual classification or registration
decisions .46
B. Labeling and Related Requirements
The EPA approach to labeling provides more explicit guid-
ance as to the Agency's attitude toward drift than does its
registration process. FIFRA emphasizes labeling as a key control
mechanism 47 by making it unlawful to misbrand a product or to
use it in any manner inconsistent with its label. 48 Under the
labeling standards, there is opportunity to consider and warn
against environmental hazards. In 1980, the EPA indicated:
41 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1980).
- 7 U.S.C. § 1360) (1980).
,' 49 Fed. Reg. 42871 (1984).
See generally 40 C.F.R. 158 (1985)..
" See 40 C.F.R. § 158.142 (1985). See also Pesticide Assessment Guidelines Sub-
division R: Spray Drift Evaluation, available from the National Technical Information
Service (NTIS), U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Springfield, VA 22161.
46 Telephone Interview with Richard W. King, Office of Pesticide Prog., EPA
(Dec. 3, May 3, 1984).
- See 7 U.S.C. § 136(p)-(q) (1980). See generally Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussion of statutory framework of
FIFRA labeling requirements).
41 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(E)(F), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(G) (1980). See also United
States v. Corbin Farm Service, 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.) (standard for labels not un-




All pesticides must be registered with the EPA before they
can be marketed. Part of the pre-market clearance process for
pesticides is approval of product labels which must include
extensive and specific information, including detailed use di-
rections and precautionary statements. Current standards re-
quire that products destined .for aerial application carry
statements regarding the potential for spray drift and means
of minimizing spray drift such as larger droplet size and max-
imum wind speeds for safe application. Use directions may
instruct the applicator to apply the pesticide in combination
with a suitable drift control agent, to observe buffer zones
around streams, ponds, other bodies of water, areas of human
habitation, or crops that are susceptible to damage by the
pesticide.
Recently registered products for aerial application carry
these labeling statements designed to minimize spray drift to
the extent possible. Older products frequently need revision to
bring labeling into accord with the more recent and extensive
drift precautions.4
9
This statement by the EPA was made in response to a
petition filed by an environmental organization, Friends of the
Earth (FOE), with the EPA and the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration seeking adoption of rules regarding labeling and enforce-
ment for aerial pesticide applications.5 Under the proposal put
forward by FOE, all pesticides would have been classified as
restricted-use pesticides when used in aerial applications, and all
aerial applicators would have been required to obtain written
permission "to allow spray drift on persons or property not in
the spray contract.' 15 The FOE petition suggested that the label
of every pesticide provide:
Warning
This pesticide must not be allowed to drift onto people or
property without prior written permission by that person or
property owner.
41 Notice, 45 Fed. Reg. 3317 (1980).
I d. at 3316.
I d. at 3319, 3323.
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For aerial application, at minimum written permission must
be obtained from all persons living or owning property within
1000 feet of the spray project boundary.
For ground rig operation other than fine droplet misting
the applicator must obtain at minimum written permission
from all persons living within or owning property within 250
feet of the spray project boundary-1000 feet for misting. 2
The FOE proposal, in a general effort to reduce reliance on
chemical pesticides, would also have had the label indicate:
"[A]n integrated pest management program for your crop may
be available from your local university or from the Extension
Service of U.S.D.A. ' 53 The FOE petition was a major effort to
obtain regulatory recognition of the concept of chemical trespass
and to limit the exposure of unconsenting persons to drift. It
was not adopted. 54
Still, a substantial number of pesticide labels in use are now
required to contain general drift precautions. 5  The drift precau-
tions which have been required on labels as a result of cancel-
lation proceedings are illustrative of this type of prohibition.
For example, in its decision document concerning the insecticide
EPN, the EPA indicated that the product's registration would
be cancelled for use on certain crops (e.g., cotton, soybean, field
corn) unless the applicants modified the terms of registration
and agreed to meet the following conditions:
2 Id. at 3323 (emphasis in original).
13 Id. at 3321. But see 7 U.S.C. § 136b(c)(1980) which provides as to instruction
in integrated pest management techniques:
Standards prescribed by the Administrator for the certification of appli-
cators of pesticides under subsection (a) of this section, and State plans
submitted to the Administrator under subsections (a) and (b) of this section,
shall include provisions for making instructional materials concerning in-
tegrated pest management techniques available to individuals at their re-
quest in accordance with the provisions of section 136u(c) of this title, but
such plans may not require that any individual receive instruction concern-
ing such techniques or be shown to be competent with respect to the use
of such techniques. The Administrator and States implementing such plans
shall provide that all interested individuals are notified of the availability
of such instructional materials.
See Notice, 47 Fed. Reg. 22,069 (1982).




The following statement must appear in the "Use Directions"
section of the label:
Do not apply this product when weather conditions favor
drift from treated area....
The following statement must appear in the "Environmen-
tal Hazards" section of the label for WP and EC formulations:
This product is highly toxic to bees exposed to direct
treatment or residues on blooming crops and weeds. Do not
apply this product or allow it to drift to blooming crops or
weeds if bees are visiting the treatment area.
5 6
Similarly the EPA required the oxyfluorfen label to provide:
In order to minimize the hazard to aquatic organisms
pending the completion of field monitoring studies, the Agency
will require the modification of the labeling of oxyfluorfen
products for all uses, including experimental uses, to contain
the following warning statement:
This pesticide is highly toxic to aquatic invertebrates, aquatic
plants, wildlife and fish. Use with care when applying in areas
frequented by wildlife or adjacent to any body of water or
wetland area. Do not apply when weather conditions favor
drift or erosion from target area.5 7
Other EPA label requirements also relate to drift control.
Many labels (for example, those indicating that wind should be
greater than two but less than ten MPH) mandate specific equip-
ment or weather conditions to minimize drift.5 8 There are also a
few instances where buffer zones are incorporated into the label
restrictions typically at the behest of the registrant.5 9
A key issue inherent in the use of label restrictions to control
drift is the interpretation and enforceability of standards of this
type. Occasionally the validity of a broad "do not allow to
-6 Notice, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,498 (1983).
" Notice, 47 Fed. Reg. 27,122 (1982). See also Notice, 48 Fed. Reg. 48,512 (1983)
(lindane); Notice, 47 Fed. Reg. 53,784 (1982) (toxaphene).
-1 EPA indicated hundreds of labels are in this category. Telephone Interview,
supra note 46.
-' EPA indicated five to seven products are in this category, including Blazer,
Lasso, 2,4-D and paraquat. Telephone Interview, supra note 46.
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drift" label prohibition is litigated.60 The refinement and inter-
pretation of these types of standards have also been the basis
for EPA's issuance of advisory opinions in a limited number of
cases. For example, in response to complaints from residents of
Scottsdale, Arizona, about drift of defoliants and desiccants
from adjoining agricultural land, the EPA issued an Advisory
Opinion Concerning Application of Cotton Defoliants in Ari-
zona:
Depending on the circumstances, the drift of cotton de-
foliants to nontarget areas can constitute use of a pesticide in
a manner "inconsistent with its labeling," which may result in
an enforcement action against the applicator under section 12
and 14 of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136j and 1361 (Supp. 1979).
However, after the fact imposition of civil penalties or other
sanctions for violations of label statements pertaining to pes-
ticide drift which do not provide guidelines for preventing drift
into nontarget areas is, at best, an awkward and inadequate
means of reducing such drift.61
The Advisory Opinion recommended application practices so
that "drift into nontarget areas will be minimized." 62 If an
applicator used the recommended practices (and followed the
other provisions of the label), the EPA would not prosecute for
a violation of FIFRA for "small amounts of measurable drift
away from the target site." '63 EPA explained its purpose as
follows:
The Agency has developed certain application practices
which should mitigate spray drift. These practices address such
areas as wind direction and velocity, distance restrictions (buffer
zones), aircraft type, aircraft speed, nozzle size, nozzle pres-
sure, nozzle angle, and dilution factors.... A particular con-
cern is to minimize spray drift into sensitive areas, which for
the purposes of this Notice means any areas where people are
actually residing, areas in which substantial commercial activ-
ities are conducted (e.g., shopping centers), any area where a
60 See notes 13 and 48 supra.
61 Notice, 44 Fed. Reg. 59,956 (1979). See also Notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,965 (1981)
(ultra-low volume applications); Notice, 44 Fed. Reg. 40,399 (1979).




school is in session or will be in session within 24 hours, public
parks and highways. 6
The specific recommendations were separately laid out for two
groups of defoliants (those with particular irritation character-
istics and all others) and varied with the type of equipment
used. 61
The recommended practices addressed such application fac-
tors as wind speed and direction, specified nozzle size, and
required buffers:
1. General Considerations .... For all aerial application
of cotton defoliants, there must be an air movement of not
less than 2 miles per hour nor more than 10 miles per hour
away from any sensitive areas. If the wind direction changes
during the application, the application must be halted. In all
applications, because of the large droplet size produced, ap-
plicators should be aware that if an insufficient volume of
diluent is used they might not obtain adequate coverage or
achieve efficacious defoliation. A nozzle pressure not to exceed
forty (40) pounds per square inch (gauge) must be used....
2. Group 1. Defoliants in Group 1 (Def. Folex, Paraquat)
must not be aerially applied closer than one-quarter mile (440
yards) from a sensitive area.
3. Group 2. Defoliants in Group 2 (Cacodylic Acid, So-
dium Cacodylate, Endothall, Sodium Chlorate, Sodium Chlor-
ate Borate, Arsenic Acid) must not be aerially applied closer
than one hundred (100) feet from a sensitive area. 66
, Id. at 59,957.
See id. For example, for hydraulic ground applications, the opinion indicated
that "[a]ir movement must be away from sensitive areas but wind speed is not specified.
In all applications, applicators should be aware that if an insufficient volume is used
they might not obtain adequate coverage or achieve efficacious defoliation." Id.
6 Id. In addition to the recommendation quoted in the text, the nozzle require-
ments further provided:
For fixed wing aerial applications, nozzles must have not less than a
one-sixteenth inch nor larger than a one-quarter inch orifice and they must
produce a jet or cone type dispersion pattern. Jet and cone nozzles may
be fitted with a No. 46 (or larger) WHIRL PLATE WHICH PRODUCES
A CONE TYPE DISPERSION PATTERN. Fan nozzles are not recom-
mended unless they are capable of producing a droplet of comparable size.
Nozzles must be directed back with the airstream. Aircraft speed must not
exceed 130 miles per hour.
For rotary wing aerial application, cone or jet nozzles must have not
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The labeling approach, together with the language in the rare
special advisory opinions issued to interpret label requirements,
indicate the kind of measures EPA has believed likely to control
drift. Also illustrative of this EPA perspective are the restrictions
that the EPA places on individual applications that need a special
exemption from the Agency.67 Typical and illustrative of the
EPA approach in this situation is the specific exemption granted
in 1981 for the Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Com-
merce to use Bolero (thiobencarb) to control barnyard grass.
The exemption includes the following conditions:
6. Applications may be made with aerial equipment using
a minimum of 10 gallons of spray mixture per acre, or with
ground equipment using 10 to 20 gallons of spray mixture per
acre.
7. All applications will be made by commercial or private
applicators certified in this category of pest control.
8. Precautions will be taken to avoid spray drift to non-
target areas. The pesticide will not be applied when weather
conditions favor drift.68
More precise are the conditions similarly imposed that same year
on the specific exemption for Florida to use permethrin on
tomatoes:
9. Permethrin is highly toxic to bees exposed to direct
treatment or residues on crops or weeds. It must not be applied
less than a one-sixteenth inch nor larger than a one-quarter inch orifice
and may be fitted with a No. 46 (or larger) whirl plate capable of producing
a cone dispersion pattern. Nozzles must be directed back with the airstream
where application speeds exceed sixty (60) miles per hour. No restriction
on nozzle angle is placed on rotary wing aircraft at application speeds of
less than sixty (60) miles per hour. Other nozzles may be used but they
must produce a droplet comparable in size to the droplets produced by the
previously mentioned equipment. Drift control agents may be used at the
applicator's discretion.
Id.
,' These "special exemptions" are yet another aspect of the regulatory process.
See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 166 (1983). Although not "labeling" in its generic sense,
the resulting directives are discussed here because of their similar nature.




or allowed to drift to weeds or crops in bloom where bees are
actively foraging....
10. Permethrin should not be applied any closer to fish-
bearing waters than indicated in the chart below: . . . . [Chart
not reproduced] The Applicant is warned that applications
closer than those allowed in the above chart may result in fish
and/or other aquatic organism kills.
11. Precautions must be taken to avoid or minimize spray
drift to nontarget areas. It is recommended that pesticide ap-
plications be made when wind speeds are between 2 and 5
miles per hour. No pesticide applications are to be made when
wind speeds exceed 10 miles per hour.
12. Permethrin is extremely toxic to fish and aquatic
invertebrates. It may not be applied directly to any body of
water, and drift reduction precautions must be observed....
13. Two endangered species, the Florida Everglade Kite
and the Southern Bald Eagle are endemic to regions in the
treatment area. Application of the pesticide according to the
above instructions and restrictions is expected to minimize the
risk to these animals. Permethrin should not be applied in
areas where spray drift could possibly impact aquatic ecosys-
tems containing federally designated endangered and threat-
ened species."
Occasionally the special exemption, such as that for nemacur on
raspberries, incorporates not only drift precautions, but also
specific residue limits for treatment areas. 70
Overall, labeling and related restrictions are the most direct
of the EPA regulations dealing with drift. As the preceding
review indicates, label requirements dealing with drift are typi-
cally very general in their terms and, their generality may tend
to make enforcement somewhat difficult. The tendency to gen-
eral warnings (unlike, for example, the approach embodied in
the limited number of advisory opinions) certainly does not
provide useful guidance to applicators, a situation not apt to be
19 Notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 16,128 (1981). See also, e.g., Notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 15,940
(1981); Notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,445 (1981).
" Notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 17,131 (1981). See also, e.g., Notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 16,130
(mint-napropamide 1981); Notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,446 (beans-oxamyl) (1981).
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resolved by the EPA approach to drift in reference to certifica-
tion.
C. Applicator Certification
In addition to labeling and registration, the third major
federal initiative to speak to drift involves the EPA criteria for
certification of pesticide applicators. This approach is even less
direct than a generally-applicable performance standard or label
precaution. Under FIFRA, the federal government prescribes
standards for applicator certification 7' and imposes them in the
absence of a satisfactory state program. Because the federal
standards for certification are incorporated in most state pro-
grams, it is useful to note their general approach and the extent
to which the standards explicitly concern themselves with issues
of drift. 72 The theory here is that by virtue of the fact that
FIFRA (and, derivatively, state law) require examination on
questions related to drift, applicators will necessarily be more
knowledgeable about preventing drift and therefore less likely to
apply pesticides in inappropriatq conditions and situations.
The general certification scheme embodies a division between
private and commercial applicators applying restricted use pes-
ticides. 73 Both private and commercial applicators must be cer-
tified, though the standards are less stringent for the former.
Private applicators, those using restricted pesticides for agricul-
tural production on their own property,74 must show general
practical knowledge of pests and pest control.7 5 Drift, as such,
is not specifically delineated as a subject of competence, but is
at least implied in two standards requiring a showing of practical
knowledge and ability to "[take] into account such factors as
" 7 U.S.C. § 136b(a)(1) (1980).
7 See generally notes 76-80, 248-50 infra and accompanying text.
73 40 C.F.R. §§ 171.7-.9, .11 (1984).
w 40 C.F.R. § 171.2(a)(20), .3 (1984). "Private applicator" is defined as:
[a] certified applicator who uses or supervises the use of any pesticide
which is classified for restricted use for purposes of producing any agri-
cultural commodity on property owned or rented by him or his employer
or (if applied without compensation other than trading of personal services
between producers of agricultural commodities) on the property of another
person.
40 C.F.R. § 171.2(a)(20) (1984).
75 40 C.F.R. § 171.5(a) (1984).
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area to be covered, speed at which application equipment will
be driven, and the quantity dispersed. . ." and to "[rlecognize
local environmental situations that must be considered during
application to avoid contamination.' 76
As to commercial applicators, the testing standards are some-
what more precise. In all subcategories of commercial applica-
tors, competence must be demonstrated regarding certain factors
in application techniques including:
(a) Methods of procedure used to apply various formu-
lations of pesticides, solutions, and gases, together with a
knowledge of which technique of application to use in a given
situation;
(b) Relationship of discharge and placement of pesticides
to proper use, unnecessary use, and misuse; and
(c) Prevention of drift and pesticide loss into the envi-
ronment .7
7
In addition, in certain subcategories of commercial applicators
(namely the agricultural, forest pest, ornamental and turf, and
right-of-way subcategories), drift is directly78 or by clear
implication79 noted as a matter concerning which competence is
to be required. By reference, these standards are also applicable
to public health, regulatory and research subcategories.80
As a result of these standards, it can be expected that appli-
cators will have some training and be exposed to some level of
testing as to factors relevant to pesticide drift. Still, this appears
to be a somewhat tangential approach to the problem. The more
direct approaches have been matters of state concern as discussed
in the following section.
II. TI-m STATE STATUTES: AN OVERVIEW
This section of the Article summarizes and provides illustra-
tion of the various approaches which state statutes utilize in
considering the control or implications of pesticide drift. Imple-
-' 40 C.F.R. § 171.5(a)(3), (4) (1984).
40 C.F.R. § 171.4(b)(1)(vii) (1984).
79 See 40 C.F.R. § 171.4(c)(3), (6) (1984).
- See 40 C.F.R. § 171.4(c)(1), (2) (1984).
- 40 C.F.R. § 171.4(c)(8)-(10) (1984).
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mentation and further definition of these statutory requirements
is often accomplished by agency regulation, discussed further in
the next section. 8'
The authority of the states to regulate pesticides is explicitly
recognized in FIFRA, which provides, in part that "[a] state
may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide
or device in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation
does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter."82
More particularly, states may establish a supplementary registra-
tion program and, consistent with federal law and EPA ap-
proval, may register products for special local needs for uses
not federally registered.83 The states may also implement their
own applicator certification programs after submitting an ac-
ceptable state plan to the EPA.8 4 In addition, where the state
regulations meet minimum federal standards, the EPA may del-
egate to the state the primary enforcement authority under FI-
FRA.85 Almost every state has been recognized as appropriately
implementing state registration, certification and enforcement
primacy. 86
Given the structure of the federal law (that is, as a law
allowing for state control consistent with federal standards), it
is not surprising that many state statutes have adopted the fed-
eral approach and, like the federal government, have ordinarily
concerned themselves directly with the pesticide products and
applicators and less directly with the actual application.' The
states, however, have enacted variations on the federal theme
both by statute and by regulation. Indeed, it is largely in these
areas where state control extends beyond the FIFRA model that
innovative approaches to the regulation of drift and off-target
residues are found.
11 Although statutes and regulations function together to control pesticide drift,
the two legislative methods are discussed here separately to draw attention to the
differences in scope and direction between programs enacted by state legislatures and
those subsequently imposed by agency regulation.
2 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1980).
7 U.S.C. § 136v(c)(1) (1980). See also 40 C.F.R. § 162.150-.186 (1984).
7 U.S.C. § 136b(a)(2), (b) (1980).
7 U.S.C. §§ 136w-I, w-2 (1982). See also 7 U.S.C. § 136u(a)(1) (1982); 40
C.F.R. pt. 173 (1984).
Telephone Interview, supra note 46.
91 The EPA summary indicates that all states had registration laws and most have
use and application laws of some type. See generally DIGEST, supra note 22.
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Many state statutes refer explicitly in some way to drift or
to concepts indicative of a concern with damage from drift.
These references range over a continuum in the extent and
directness of the control imposed. At one extreme, in a very few
instances, drift is directly prohibited. In other cases, the states
regulate drift through restriction on application, either through
performance standards for application or through requiring a
permit for specific applications. In still other instances, drift is
considered in setting requirements for insurance, licensing, re-
cord keeping or enforcement. Some state legislatures have been
even less specific, indicating only a general concern with the
subject of drift and authorizing further regulation by the state's
pesticide agency. Toward the further end of the continuum, there
are those state statutes that recognize control of drift as a reason
for governmental intervention in pesticide use, but refer to the
subject specifically only in the purpose section, presumably leav-
ing implementation to the regulatory agency. At the extreme
end, there are statutes which do not speak to drift, though even
here the statutes tend to imply the authority for its regulation
by their reference to environmental concern.
This section describes the state statutes in two broad divi-
sions: first, those provisions where state law largely follows the
federal law, in requiring registration, classification, labeling and
applicator certification;88 and second, those provisions less influ-
enced by FIFRA, including permit requirements, product or area
restrictions, performance standards and the like.
A. Use of the Federal Model: Labeling, Registration,
Classification and Certification
As to the pesticide product itself, most states, consistent with
FIFRA, require that pesticides be registered, be adequately and
11 Before beginning the substantive discussion of statutory provisions, a note on
the choice and use of terminology is necessary. The study of a large number of statutes
and regulations reveals a measure of inconsistency in the terminology used. Despite such
differences in terms, the concepts are fairly uniform from state to state. To simplify the
comparison somewhat, the following terms are used in the text to reflect the general
approaches to regulation: I. Registration: the requirement that a product be approved
by the state before use; 2. Certification and/or licensing: the requirement that the
applicator(s) be approved by the state before using pesticides or specified categories of
pesticides; 3. Permitting: the requirement that a specific type of use (specific, for
example, as to site, product or time) be approved by the state prior to application.
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appropriately labeled and be designated as restricted or general
use pesticides.89 In these aspects the state statutes, like their
federal counterpart, seldom deal explicitly with pesticide drift.
While labeling is one of the stronger tools under FIFRA, it
is the least significant of the areas of direct state involvement.
This limited state role is a result of FIFRA's explicitly precluding
states' imposition of "any requirements for labeling or packag-
ing in addition to or different from those required under this
subchapter." 9 State statutes routinely track the federal language
as to labeling, making it unlawful to use a product in a manner
inconsistent with its label.9' The label is thus a central tool in
both federal and state enforcement of appropriate application,
but the direct influence of state statutes in prescribing label
standards, in this sphere where federal control is preemptive, is
minimal.92
Registration is another aspect of pesticide regulation where
state legislation is generally patterned after the federal model.
The Iowa statute is representative of the majority of states in
requiring that the pesticide be registered and in providing that
the Secretary of Agriculture shall register the product if it ap-
pears "that the composition of the article is such as to warrant
the proposed claims for it and if the article and its labeling and
other material required to be submitted comply with the require-
ments of this chapter, he shall register the article." 93
See generally DIGEST, supra note 22.
10 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1980).
1, See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-230(19)-(20), -231, -232 (1981); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 217.544(19), (20), (22), .580(2)(c)(2), .670 (Michie 1982) [hereinafter cited
as KRS]; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 263.270(23), (24) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1984); NEE. REv.
STAT. § 2-2601(22), (23), (26) (1983); Nav. REv. STAT. §§ 586.170, .180 (1979); N.Y.
ENVTY. CONSERV. LAW § 33-0101(25), (26), (29) (McKinney 1984); WASH. REv. CODE §§
15.58.060, .58.150 (1983).
92 The states' involvement is not, however, nonexistent. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD &
AORuc. CODE §§ 12851-12859, 12882 (West. Cum. Supp. 1984). See also IND. CODE
ANN. 15-3-1.5 (Burns 1983) (herbicides' labeling specifically addressed); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 6, § 1104(3) (Cum. Supp. 1984) (deletion from label of uses found unwise or
dangerous).
" IOWA CODE ANN. § 206.12(4) (Vest Cum. Supp. 1984). See also, e.g., IND.
CODE ANN. § 15-3-3.5-5 (Burns 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 263.300(9) (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1984); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 2-2602(1)(a), 2-2603(4) (1983); Na,. R . STAT. §
586.290(1) (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 76-4-6(H) (1981); N.Y. ENVTL. CoNsEav. LAW §
33-0709 (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-442(d) (Michie 1983); OKJA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 2, § 3-63 (West Cum. Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-13-40(I) (Law. Co-
op. Cum. Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 94.68(5) (West 1972).
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The Arkansas statute is somewhat broader in its scope. In
addition to the criteria outlined in the Iowa law, it lists the
following standards, reminiscent of FIFRA, for special local-
needs registration. The product must "perform its intended func-
tion without unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."
In addition, "when used in accordance with widespread and
commonly recognized practice," the product must be found to
"not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the envi-
ronment."
94
Maine law is unusual in the precision with which it addresses
registration and requires environmental review. Prior to re-reg-
istration, the Maine statute mandates that there be:
An environmental risk assessment to determine the effects
of pesticides on the ecosystem. This assessment is to be based
on available literature. The commissioner shall request data
that he determines necessary to carry out the purpose of this
chapter, but, when the literature is not available, is inadequate
or incomplete, this assessment shall be based on an environ-
mental monitoring protocol .... 95
If this review shows that "the impact of the pesticide on the
ecosystem warrants additional health or environmental safe-
guards," the Maine Department is to "require implementation
of those safeguards prior to reregistration.
' 96
Even given the few statutes like Maine's which focus in detail
on environmental concerns, the registration process as delineated
in the state statutes is not predominantly designed nor imple-
mented in a manner intended to influence or control drift. A
"I ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-232(8) (1981). See also, e.g., KRS § 217.570(8) (1982);
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 921.02(G) (Page Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 634.016 (1981).
Note that there is a distinction in some states between the standards applied to: (1)
federally registered pesticides also required to be state registered for the same uses as
on the federal label; and (2) pesticides which may be registered by the state for additional
uses for special local needs. E.g., compare KRS § 217.570(5) (state registered pesticides)
with § 217.570(8) (federally registered pesticides). See also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 33.0701 (McKinney 1984).
9' ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 607-A(2)(a) (Supp. 1984).
9 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 607-A(3) (Supp. 1984). See also CALn. FOOD &
Acuc. CODE § 12824 (West. Cum. Supp. 1984) (providing, in part that before the first
registration or renewal of registration "there shall be a thorough evaluation" and that
"[aippropriate restrictions may be placed upon its use including, but not limited to,
limitations on quantity, area and manner of application").
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somewhat more likely area for drift to be considered is in the
decision whether a product is to be classified as a restricted use
or a general use pesticide under state law. As under FIFRA,
restricted use pesticides may typically be applied only by certified
or licensed applicators, while general use pesticides can be ap-
plied without such state approval. Accordingly, placing a pesti-
cide on the restricted list is a direct method of limiting and
controlling its availability and use, and also of imposing a knowl-
edge standard on those applying the product.
State statutes again tend to follow the federal criteria for the
classification division between restricted and general use. 7 As
discussed previously, the standards for categorization are broad
enough to allow a product to be restricted because of existing
or potential drift problems. However, no state statutes were
identified that explicitly acknowledged this possibility, although
a few slightly amplified the federal statutory criteria in ways
that imply more concern with drift. These are well illustrated by
the Indiana definition of "restricted use pesticide" as one that
is "... found and determined to be unduly hazardous to per-
sons, pollinating insects, bees, animals, crops, wildlife or lands,
other than the pests it is intended to prevent ... "98
There are also instances in which state legislation provides
for an additional category of pesticide classification. While the
terminology differs99 the intent of such a category appears to be
to allow the state regulatory agency to take further cognizance
of local concerns. Accordingly, once a product is classified within
this state category, additional regulatory requirements are likely
to be imposed on its use. 10° The Indiana statute is again exem-
plary in its definition of "pesticide for use by prescription only"
as "any pesticide which the board has found to be more haz-
9 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 604(30) (1964); IND. CODE ANN. § 15-
3-3.6-3(26) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-2613(1) (1983).
" IND. CODE ANN. § 15-3-3.5-2(27) (1983) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., KRS
§ 217B.050(3) (1982); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 263.270(33) (Cum. Supp. 1984); notes 37-40
supra.
, See, e.g., COLO. RyV. STAT. § 35-9-105(d) (1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 15-3-3.5-
2(24) (1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 206.2(25) (West Cum. Supp. 1984); ME. R v. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1471-C(16) (1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 634.306 (1981); TEX. AGRIC. CODE
ANN. § 76-003 (Vernon 1982); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 15.58.030(19) (1983); W. VA.
CODE § 19-16B-4(c) (1984).
' See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1471-C(16) (1980); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 921.16(D) (Page Supp. 1983).
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ardous by one criterion or another than a restricted use pesticide
so that any specific use and application shall be determined and
prescribed by a qualified past [sic: pest] management specialist
approved by the state chemist."''
The last area where state statutes follow the federal model,
certification of competency of applicators, tends to demonstrate
a more in-depth concern with drift than either labeling or reg-
istration and classification. Concern with environmental harm is
reflected in applicator certification programs either in the stat-
utory requirements for the categorization of applicators'0 2 or in
the levels of competency required to be demonstrated. 0 3 In the
former case it is not uncommon, for example, for state legisla-
tion to provide explicitly for particularized requirements for
aerial applicators, presumably because of a perception of the
likelihood of added harm from inappropriate aerial applica-
tion.' °4 In the latter, there appears to be a distinction contem-
plated between levels of competency for commercial applicators
and private applicators, with requirements for private applicators
often being less extensive. 05
Within this scheme, in some states, the statutes explicitly
refer to knowledge of drift and related issues as a basis for
certification of competency. For example, Kansas law provides
that commercial applicators must pass an examination which
tests, in part, their knowledge as to the following:
(a) The proper use of the equipment.
(b) The hazards that may be involved in applying the
pesticides, including:
... IND. CODE ANN. §§ 15-3-3.5-2(24), .5-10(1), .5-11, .5-18 (1983).
"I See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 15-3-3.6-5 (1983).
101 See notes 73-80 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 247-50 infra and
accompanying text.
Im See, e.g., ARIz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 3-377.01 (Supp. Pamphlet 1984); CALIF.
FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 11901-11940 (West Cum. Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §
206.6(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-452, -453 (1983). Accord
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-2441a (1982); KRS § 217B.130 (1982). A related type of licensing
is that required in a few states of "pesticide consultants," those who give advice about
pesticide applications. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 764-14 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
143-455 (1983).
101 E.g., compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-2443a (1982) with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-
2445a (1982) (commercial applicator certificate requires fee plus an extensive written
examination to show applicant has adequate knowledge, whereas private applicator
certificate is obtained with smaller fee plus open-book examination of applicant).
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(1) The effect of drift of the pesticides on adjacent and
nearby lands and other nontarget organisms;
(2) The proper meteorological conditions for the appli-
cation of pesticides and the precautions to be taken therewith;
(3) The effect of the pesticides on plants or animals in
the area, including the possibility of damage to plants or
animals or the possibility of illegal pesticide residues resulting
on them .... lO6
In many more cases, knowledge of drift concerns is covered
statutorily only by implication and more directly by agency
regulation. 107
Also significant in the states' applicator certification pro-
grams are the parallel statutory provisions for license revocation.
These commonly include as grounds for suspension or revocation
findings that the applicator is no longer qualified; has engaged
in fraudulent business practices; has used pesticides in a careless,
faulty or negligent manner or in a manner potentially harmful
to the environment; or has violated the statute or rules of the
state.105
B. Other Approaches: State Innovation
Overall, the basic approaches to state pesticide control dis-
cussed in reference to the federal model appear to concern
themselves somewhat tangentially with drift. However, these are
not the only ways in which state legislatures have addressed the
issue. It is generally observed in the field of regulatory law that,
,o KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-2443a (1982). See also KRS § 217B.070(3) (1982).
See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 94.705(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1984) (,Wisconsin's
reference to federal standards).
'1 See generally CoLo. REv. STAT. § 35-10-112 (1984); HAwAii REv. STAT. § 149A-
18 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, § 814 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1984); KRS § 217B.120
(1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3275 (West Cum. Supp. 1984); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 1471-D(8) (Cum. Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 80-8-211 (1983); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-451 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 4-35-16 (1975); OGio REV. CODE
ANN. § 921.24 (Page Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 3-86 (West Cum. Supp.
1984); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 111.29 (Purdon Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws §
23-25-18 (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-13-90 (Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1983); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 43-9-105 (1980); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 76.076 (Vernon 1982); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 1104(8) (Cum. Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 3.1-249.8 (1983); W. VA.
CODE § 19-16B-14 (1984). See also note 131 infra and accompanying text.
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in any area where the federal government has not preempted the
field, the states will act as a laboratory, utilizing a diversity of
approaches to achieve the objective. The area of pesticide control
is an excellent example of this principle. While virtually all state
statutes follow the federal model in their approach to labeling,
registration, classification, and applicator certification, many
statutes extend beyond these areas, often in ways which reflect
a growing concern with drift.
The diverse state approaches fall into eight types of legislative
directives: (1) direct prohibition of drift; (2) withdrawal of cer-
tain areas from spraying; (3) permit systems; (4) establishment
of both substantive and procedural performance standards; (5)
requirements as to financial and legal liability; (6) enforcement
techniques; (7) recognition of drift control or mitigation as a
legislative purpose; and (8) rulemaking authority. The last, rule-
making authority, is itself the basis of yet further and more
definitive control through the adoption of agency rules discussed
in the next section.
1. Direct Prohibition of Drift
Perhaps the most forthright approach to the regulation or
control of drift by statute is through its direct prohibition. While
a few states have prohibitory regulations, statutory provisions
of this kind are very rare. One example is the California statu-
tory provision which, in the section governing pesticide usage,
provides: "The use of any pesticide by any person shall be in
such a manner as to prevent substantial drift to nontarget
areas."' ' 9 The impact of such broad statutory standards is de-
"o CAUFORNIA FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 12972 (West Cum. Supp. 1984). See also
the California rules discussed in notes 180-83 infra and accompanying text. In a similar
manner, prior to its repeal, Maine's pesticide statute provided that it was unlawful "[flor
any person to apply pesticides in a manner which results in off-target residues." ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 606(2)(G) (amended 1984). Within a year after enactment, the
Maine law was amended to make it unlawful "[flor any person to apply pesticides in a
manner inconsistent with rules for pesticide application adopted by the board." See ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 606(2)(G) (Cum. Supp. 1984). As to the type of rules
contemplated, the statutory revision indicates that the rules were to be designed to
"minimize pesticide drift to the maximum extent practicable under currently available
technology," and then, "[w]ithout limitation" provided that the rules "may prescribe
procedure to be used for the application of pesticides, including the time, place, manner
and method of that application, may restrict or prohibit use of pesticides in designated
areas or during specified periods of time, and may prescribe tolerance levels for pesticide
residues in off-target areas." Id.
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termined by the agency's implementing regulations discussed in
the next section.
2. Withdrawal of Certain Areas from Spraying
A second direct approach by which state legislation can
prevent damage from drift or off-target spray is to withdraw the
area which might be damaged, together with an adequate buffer
zone, from eligibility as a spray site. Only a few state statutes
were identified using this technique and there is substantial va-
riety in their approach. For example, New York allows certain
grape growing areas to be specifically protected from spraying.
The statutory process first requires a petition to protect a grape
growing area to be signed by ten or more growers in the same
or contiguous towns. The petition must allege that the use of
2,4-D, 2,4,5-T, or MCP near the vineyards has harmed the
grape crop and request restriction or prohibition in the affected
area."10 An order may then be issued limiting or restricting the
specified products in the area subject to the petition and for a
two-mile radial distance from the site of the damage. The order
is issued if the state finds that there has been damage "caused
by the use of the chemical substance complained of ... and by
that cause alone"; that the use was on lands in or proximate to
an affected area; and that the grape production is a major source
of agricultural income."'
Oregon provides a much more extended range of possibilities
for removing lands from spray areas, as well as an intricate
scheme for regulation of such removed areas. On petition from
at least 25 landowners representing 70 percent of the acres in
the area, the Oregon Department of Agriculture may establish a
"protected area.""12 In deciding whether to establish such an
area, specific agricultural, topographical, meteorological and en-
vironmental factors are considered." 3 Once established, a pro-
tected area is a type of political subdivision regulated by a
"governing committee" established under the terms of the stat-
ute. "4 The committee then annually promulgates rules "govern-
,, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 33-1101 (McKinney 1984).
See N.Y. ENWL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 33-0101, -1105 (1984).
22 OR. REv. STAT. § 634.212 (1981).
"' OR. REv. STAT. § 634.212 (1981).
'" OR. REV. STAT. §§ 634.222, .226 (1981). The areas may be funded by a tax
levy. OR. REv. STAT. § 634.242 (1981).
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ing or prohibiting the application of pesticides within the protected
area, by aircraft or otherwise, which relate to the time, place,
method of pesticide application and other matters necessary to
prevent damage or injury to susceptible crops, insects, wildlife
or forests. ' "1 5
In addition to the establishment of protected areas, the Or-
egon law envisions the establishment of "restricted areas" up to
ten airline miles beyond the boundary of the protected area."6
Within this restricted area all pesticides can be restricted for one
mile and herbicides can be restricted for up to ten miles." 7
Oregon's approach is far-reaching, allowing the possibility of a
certain amount of resident "self-determination" of susceptibility
to spray or spray drift. Unlike the New York approach to
withdrawal, the Oregon formation of protected areas is not
necessarily based on damage.
A third statute of this type is the Oklahoma law which
presents a more limited version of withdrawal than that found
in either Oregon or New York. Oklahoma authorizes a petition,
(from at least 25 percent of the occupants of agricultural lands
of a county) to require a hearing to establish a date after which
hormone-type sprays will not be allowed." 8
3. Permit Systems
Prohibition of drift and removal of an area from possible
spray are perhaps the most direct statutory approaches, but there
are numerous other methods used for controlling drift. One of
the more focused of these approaches is that in which permits
are required for certain pesticide applications. Permit require-
ments call attention to a particular use and allow site- or prod-
uct-specific decisions to be considered and limited. In some
instances, the imposition of a permit requirement and the ulti-
mate issuance of a permit may, by the terms of the statute, be
", OR. REV. STAT. § 634.226(4)(a) (1981).
"6 OR. REv. STAT. § 634.232 (1981).
,,7 OR. REv. STAT. § 634.232(3)(a) (1981).
"I OKLA. REv. STAT. tit. 2, § 3-84 (West Cum. Supp. 1984).
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related to the likelihood of drift although more often the precise
standards appear in agency regulations. 1 9
4. Performance Standards
It is unusual to find state statutes which set out performance
standards-that is, which mandate explicitly how pesticides are
to be or not to be, applied. However, legislation occasionally
does make the setting of these standards mandatory and, more
rarely, sets a statutory standard to be followed in certain speci-
fied situations. California presents one example of this approach
in its limitation on use of certain designated products or classes
of products. 2 1
A second example is presented by the legislation in states
addressing the possibilty of mitigating drift by controlling ap-
plication technique through required registration or inspection
of equipment. New Mexico law, for example, provides:
A. The department shall provide for an annual inspection
of any equipment used for the application of pesticides by a
commercial pesticide applicator and may require repairs or
other changes before the equipment is used to apply pesticides.
A list of requirements that the equipment shall meet shall be
provided by the department.
B. Any piece of equipment which fails inspection shall
... not be put back into service until it has passed reinspec-
tion .... 121
"I See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 3-85 (West Cum. Supp. 1984). See also ALA.
CODE § 2-27-11 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (restricted use); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 77-233 (1981)
(experimental use); CALIF. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 11931-11940 (,Vest 1968 & Supp.
1984) (aerial operators); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-51 (1975) (experimental use);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1214 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (restricted use pesticide; experimental
use); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3273 (West Cum. Supp. 1984) (pesticide waste); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 4-35-07 (1975) (experimental use); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 921.03 (Page
Supp. 1983) (experimental use); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-25-7 (1979) (experimental use);
TEx. AGosc. CODE ANN. § 76.048 (Vernon 1982) (experimental use); WAsH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 17.21.030 (1983) (restricted use); Wyo. STAT. § 35-7-357 (1977) (experimental
use); notes 235-48 infra and accompanying text.
110 See CALIF. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 14006 (West Cum. Supp. 1984) (restricted
materials as defined under § 14004.5).
121 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 76-4-26 (1981). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-452 (1983);
notes 135-36 infra and accompanying text.
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Another method by which legislation occasionally controls
application is through procedural burdens. For example, the
Massachusetts pesticide statutes require that utilities notify town
officials before herbicide spraying in their area.'22 Similarly,
several states make it unlawful to aerially apply any pesticide
toxic to bees without first providing notice to registered apiary
owners. 12 Far more common than these direct statutory ap-
proaches is the legislative delegation of authority to the desig-
nated administrative agency to establish such standards. As
discussed in the next section of this Article, agencies have im-
posed performance standards in a wide variety of ways, both
substantive and procedural.
5. Financial and Legal Liability
Potential liability for damage caused by pesticide application
is a complex subject. 2 4 The imposition of liability is obviously
a standard governmental answer to deterring misapplication of
pesticides; that is, an applicator who assumes his or her liability
in the case of pesticide drift will presumably act with more
caution. Requiring applicators to provide a stated amount of
insurance coverage is one way to begin to make applicators more
aware of their potential liability. The technique also assures that
where an applicator is at fault, the person damaged will be able
to recover at least in the amount of the insurance.
'= MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 132B, § 6B (Michie/Law Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1984).
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-443(b)(4) (1983). See also CALIF. FOOD &
AcRIC. CODE §§ 29141-29145.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1984).
114 The scope of this Article does not extend to questions of liability for pesticide
damage as it has been determined and assessed by the courts. Obviously, in some cases
the courts have been called upon to construe and apply specific legislative provisions
like those discussed in this section and the section on regulation to assess liability of
various kinds. See, e.g., J.L. Wilson Farms, Inc. v. Wallace, 590 S.W.2d 42, 44-45
(Ark. Ct. App. 1979) (plant board's regulations properly considered in determining
negligence); Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 335 S.W.2d 624, 629 (rex. Civ. App.
1960) (agency regulations referred to as to appropriate wind velocity). More frequently
the courts have been called upon to use the principles of common law-rather than
statute-to resolve private disputes concerning harm alleged to have resulted from
pesticide application. See generally notes 1-13 supra and accompanying text.
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Virtually all states require some form of commercial appli-
cator insurance.' 25 Of these, several states specifically mention
drift as a problem to be covered by such insurance. Alabama
law is illustrative: "Each applicant for a license to perform the
custom application of pesticides shall ... file with the commis-
sioner a surety bond ... conditioned for the protection of...
persons who may suffer legal damages as a result of licensee's
custom application of pesticides, or drift to plants, animals, or
property .... "126 Still other states, by indicating that lands in-
tended to be sprayed are not covered by the requisite insurance,
imply that at least in part the statutory requirement contemplates
harm off target. 127
Several states, in addition to requiring liability insurance, go
a step further in indicating the extent of responsibility by spe-
cifically providing that the pesticide laws are not to be seen as
a limitation on liability. Kentucky's provision is representative:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to relieve any person
from liability for any damage to the person or lands of another
caused by the use of pesticides even though such use conforms
to the rules and regulations of this department."'128 A similar
disclaimer is the Michigan statutory statement that "[a] certifi-
cate or license issued by the director shall not exonerate the
holder from responsibility for damage resulting from misuse of
pesticides such as ... overdosing, drifting or misapplication."' 29
While statutes like Kentucky's or Michigan's leave open all
legal remedies, it should be noted that there are a few state
statutes which are more limiting in setting forth the standard of
' See, e.g., GA. CODE Am. § 5-1512a (1981); IDAHO CODE § 22-3404(2)(c) (Cum.
Supp. 1984); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 5, § 810(3) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1984); IND.
CODE ANN. § 15-3-3.6-13 (Burns 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 206.13 (Cum. Supp. 1984);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-2448 (1982); KRS § 217B.130 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 18A.36
(West 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 69-21-13 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 76-4-24 (1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-467 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-9-104 (1980); TEX. AGRuc.
CODE ANN. § 76.111 (Vernon 1982). See also AiA. CODE § 2-27-56 (1977); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 281.065 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1984); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 921.10 (Page
Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-13-100 (Law. Co-op. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6,
§ 1106 (1972); VA. CODE § 3.1-249.9 (Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 19-16B-15 (1984).
126 ALA. CODE § 2-27-56 (1977).
'11 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 281.065(1) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1984).
-- KRS § 217B.130(4) (1982). See also, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 15-3-3.6-13 (Bums
1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 281.065(4) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1984); OHiO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 921.10(E) (Page Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 1106 (1972).
"9 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 12.340(17)(1) (Callaghan 1981).
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proof to be required. Mississippi, for example, provides that
"[t]he plaintiff ... shall allege and prove that the damage
complained of is the result of negligence on the part of the...
defendant." 30
6. Enforcement Techniques
Like the imposition of financial liability for the consequences
from pesticide drift, there are a variety of mechanisms related
to the enforcement of pesticide standards that may serve to
control drift as well as other kinds of misapplication. The chief
enforcement tools are license revocation and the imposition of
penalties. Related to these are statutory requirements for inspec-
tion, monitoring, tolerances and recordkeeping.
Virtually all state statutes list grounds for license revoca-
tion, 3 ' delineate "unlawful acts,' ' 32 define penalties 33 and au-
I" Miss. CODE ANN. § 69-12-15 (1973). Accord, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 586.290(2)
(1983).
,31 See note 108 supra. See also Wingfield v. Fielder, 105 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1972) (icense revocation and suspension in case involving damage from herbicide
drift). Cf. Medlock Dusters Inc. v. Dooley, 181 Cal. Rptr. 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(effort to suspend license in a drift situation, remanded for more specific findings). As
to license suspension or revocation in general, see, e.g., Aantex Pest Control Co. v.
Structural Pest Control, 166 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1980) (license revocation for negligent use
of endrin in extermination); Camacho v. Youde, 157 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1979) (suspension
of employer's pest control license for employee's spraying on innocent bystanders);
Grace v. Structural Pest Control Bd. of Texas, 620 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
(reprimand for failure to register and for performing work in category for which not
certified).
"1 See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1224 (Cum. Supp. 1984); ILL. STAT.
ANN. ch. 5, § 814 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3226 (West
Cum. Supp. 1984); MoNTr. CODE ANN. § 80-8-305 (1983); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 33-1301 (McKinney 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 4-35-15 (1975); Omo R v. CODE ANN.
§ 921-25 (Page Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 3-62 (West Cum. Supp. 1984);
OR. REV. STAT. § 634.372 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-25-18 (1979); TEx. AGRiC. CODE
ANN. § 76.201 (Vernon 1982 & Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 3.1.249.8 (1983); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 94.70 (West Cum. Supp. 1984). Of the most relevance to the discussion of drift
are those provisions which make it unlawful to apply a pesticide in a manner inionsistent
with its label, to apply a pesticide in a faulty, careless or negligent manner or to use
pesticides in a manner inconsistent with agency rules. As to the constitutionality of this
type of regulation in general terms, see generally United States v. Corbin Farm Service,
444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978); Wingfield v. Fielder, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26.
M See generally, e.g., ALA. CODE § 2-27-16 (1975) (misdemeanor/gross misde-
meanor); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-55 (West Supp. 1983) (penalties established);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1224 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (misdemeanor); HAwAn REV. STAT.
§ 149A-41 (Supp. 1983) (civil/criminal); ILL. STAT. ch. 5, § 824 (Smith-Hurd Cum.
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thorize the inspection of spray sites and sites adjacent thereto. 34
Many specifically authorize the inspection of equipment as well. 35
Often such inspection is a key both to deterrence of misuse of
pesticides and to assessment of liability. The Ohio statute is
perhaps most on point in its implications as to drift in this
regard:
(A) The director of agriculture may: ...
(2) Enter upon any public or private premises at any time,
when or where pesticides are being applied to determine if the
applicator is or should be certified or licensed, if proper notice
has been given before pesticide application, and to collect
samples of pesticides being applied or available for use, and
to inspect equipment or devices used to apply pesticides;
(3) Enter upon any public or private premises at reason-
able hours to inspect any property thereon, to collect samples
Supp. 1984) (class C/B misdemeanor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3226, 3276 (West Cum.
Supp. 1984) (civil); Mo. CODE ANN. § 281.105 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1984) (misde-
meanor); MONT. CODE ANN. § 80-8-306 (1983) (misdemeanor); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 149-D:11 (1977) (misdemeanor/felony/civil penalty); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1F0 (West
1979) (civil penalty); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 111.49 (Purdon Supp. 1983) (criminal
penalty), § 111.507 (Purdon Supp. 1983) (civil penalty); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-25-8 (1979)
(civil/criminal); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-13-180 (Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1983) (misde-
meanor); TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-9-106 (1980) (misdemeanor); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §
1107 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (criminal); VA. CODE § 3.1-244, .1-245 (1983) (misdemeanor/
warning); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 17.21.310 (1983) (misdemeanor/gross misdemeanor);
W. VA. CODE § 19-16B-22 (1984) (misdemeanor/civil penalty); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 94-
71 (West Cum. Supp. 1984) (civil/criminal); Wyo. STAT. § 35-7-366 (Cum. Supp. 1984)
(misdemeanor/penalty).
1 See generally, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-373 (1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
3, § 1226 (Cum. Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 487.164(1) (West 1981); GA. CODE
ANN. § 5-1522a (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, § 815 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1984);
IND. CODE ANN. § 15-3-3.5-18 (Burns 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 80-8-304 (1983); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 149-D:6 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-466(e) (1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 4-35-24 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 111.53 (Purdon Supp. 1983); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-25-20 (Cum. Supp. 1984); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 38-21-53 (1977);
W. VA. CODE § 19-16B-24 (1984). In some cases search warrants are explicitly authorized.
See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3204 (West Cum. Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-
13-170 (Law. Co-op. 1977); S.D. Com. LAWS ANN. § 38-21-54 (1977).
'" See ALA. CODE § 2-27-61 (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-373 (1974); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 35-10-115 (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 487.164(1) (West 1981); HAWAI REv.
STAT. § 149A-36 (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-2462(1) (1982); KRS § 217B.160, .070(2)(e)
(1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 80-8-304(1)(a) (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 149-D:6(II)
(1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-466 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 4-35-24 (Cum.
Supp. 1983); Omo REv. CODE ANN. 921.18 (Page Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-
25-20(1), 23-25-20(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1984); S.D. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 38-21-53 (1977);
VA. CODE § 3.1-249.18 (1983). See also note 121 supra and accompanying text.
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of vegetation or animal life, water, soil, or other matter, in
order to determine residue levels, efficacy of application, or
adverse effects of application, drift, or spillage; ...
(3) When the director or his authorized agent observes, or
has reasonable cause to believe that a piece of equipment used
by a custom applicator, or operator requires calibration, ad-
justment, or repair to enable it to perform satisfactorily, he
may require such adjustment to be made immediately or issue
a "stop operation" order pending repair to the equipment and
he may require a demonstration of it before cancellation or
withdrawal of the "stop operation" order. 136
The Ohio law authorizes observation, sampling and control of
equipment. These actions are all types of governmental interven-
tion which may contribute to more careful pesticide applications
and thus lessen the likelihood of drift occurring. While not
directly speaking to drift, these sections and others contemplat-
ing monitoring will undoubtedly impact application techniques.
Ahother enforcement-type approach that may encourage more
careful application is suggested by those state statutes which seek
to limit pesticide residues or tolerances, The premise is that
enforcement of the law and control of misuse will best occur
where there is a measurable standard imposed defining unac-
ceptable pesticide levels. Maine is the only state identified where
the legislature had sought to define (and thus control) drift by
residue standards, making it explicitly unlawful "[flor any per-
son to apply pesticides in a manner which results in off-target
residues.' '137 A few other states, such as Oregon and California,
have a statute requiring the adoption of tolerances and residue
standards, usually for food or pasturage. 31 Still other state
1-6 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 921.18 (Page Supp. 1983). See also, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 5-1515a (1981); KAN. STAT. AN. § 2-2462 (1982); KRS § 217B-230 (1982); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-466 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 111.41 (Purdon Supp. 1983);
TEX. AaRic. CODE ANN. § 76.115 (Vernon 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 1104(2) (Cum,
Supp. 1984). In some states equipment must be specially identified. See e.g., N.D. CENT.
CODE § 4-35-17 (1975).
The statute went on to require that "[tihe Board of Pesticides Control shall
issue standards to define what constitutes chemical trespass or off-target drift by June
1, 1984." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 606.2.G (repealed 1984). See note 109 supra
for description of the 1984 amendment.
"I See, e.g., CAtiF, FOOD & AoRuC. CODE §§ 12501-12623 (West 1968 & Cum.
Supp. 1984); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 616.345, .346, .366, 634.042 (1981).
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statutes imply concern with residues by reference to inspection
and taking of samples to test, at least in part, for residues from
drift or off-target deposits. 39 The implications of these types of
approaches are better understood in the context of agency rules
proscribing drift, either per se or in reference to some standard
of unreasonable or significant damage. Once a "significance"
or "damage" criterion is incorporated, the measurement of lev-
els to ascertain if the significant level has been reached is crucial;
this question is elaborated under the next heading.
In addition to inspection and related provisions, another
enforcement tool used by the majority of states is the require-
ment that commercial applicators keep some kind of records.'14
In some cases there is specific statutory reference to a record of
weather conditions.' 4' For example, in Kansas, applicators are
required to provide to their customers a written statement as to
services which includes, among other information, "the wind
direction and velocity, when applicable.''142
Another aspect of reporting includes the requirements of
many states that damage caused by pesticide application be
reported. Typically, an applicator is required to notify the en-
forcing agency of pesticide accidents; a large number of states
"3 See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 921.18 (Page Supp. 1983).
See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 35-10-111(2) (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, §
1234 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, § 818 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1984); KRS §
217B.150 (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-466 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 4-35-16 (1975);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 3-83 (West Cum. Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-25-
23(3) (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-13-120 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TEx. AMiuC. CODE ANN.
§ 76.114 (Vernon 1982); VA. CODE § 3.1-249.11 (1983).
'14 Not surprisingly, weather conditions are often the basis of imposing liability in
private litigation as well. For example, the Missouri court stated the standard simply:
"ID]ue care must be exercised in seeing to it that weather conditions are right ... and
that [the spreaders] do not spread dust when the wind is so blowing as to float it to the
crops of others." Faire v. Burke, 252 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Mo. 1952) (citing annot., 12
A.L.R.2D 436, 438 (1952)). In this regard courts have also recognized the significance
of heavy wind and fog in determining liability. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Aircraft Corp.
v. Whitehead, 357 So. 2d 122 (Miss. 1978). In addition, defendants have been liable for
failure to take into account that the wind was likely to shift over the period of time the
2.4-D pesticide fumes could reasonably be expected to remain. Binder v. Perkin, 516
P.2d 1012 (Kan. 1973). Defendants likewise have been found negligent for failure to use
a wind gauge or take steps to ascertain wind velocity. See Pitchfork Land and Cattle
Co. v. King, 335 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).




also outline a specific procedure under which those injured by
pesticide application must report their claim. 143
7. Recognition of Drift Control
Some of the more recent state statutes have definitively rec-
ognized the control of drift as a purpose of state intervention.
North Carolina, for example, in the preamble to its pesticide
law notes:
(b) The purpose of this Article is to regulate in the public
interest the use, application, sale, disposal and registration of
insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, defoliants, desiccants, plant
growth regulators, nematicides, rodenticides, and any other
pesticides designated by the North Carolina Pesticide Board.
New pesticides are continually being discovered or synthesized
which are valuable for the control of insects, fungi, weeds,
nematodes, rodents, and for use as defoliants, desiccants, plant
regulators and related purposes. However, such pesticides may
be ineffective or may seriously injure health, property, or
wildlife if not properly used. Pesticides may injure man or
animals, either by direct poisoning or by gradual accumulation
of poisons in the tissues. Crops or other plants may also be
injured by their improper use. The drifting or washing of
pesticides into streams or lakes can cause appreciable danger
to aquatic life. A pesticide applied for the purpose of killing
pests in a crop, which is not itself injured by the pesticide,
may drift and injure other crops or nontarget organisms with
which it comes in contact. In furtherence of the findings and
recommendations of the Legislative Research Commission, it
is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of North
Carolina that for the protection of the health, safety, and
welfare of the people of this State, and for the promotion of
a more secure, healthy and safe environment for all the people
of the State, the future sale, use and application of pesticides
'I These statutes follow a fairly standard format. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 4-35-21 (Supp. 1983) (person damaged/defined by rule); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
2, § 3-95 (West Cum. Supp. 1984) (person damaged); OR. REV. STAT. § 634.172 (1981)
(person damaged); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-13-110 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (defined by rule);
TEx. Acmic. CODE ANN. § 76-184 (Vernon 1982) (person damaged).
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shall be regulated supervised and controlled by the State in the
manner herein provided. 4
North Carolina further reflects its interest in drift issues by
authorizing the pesticide board to "[c]arry out a program of
planning, environmental and biological monitoring, and inves-
tigation into long-range needs and problems concerning pesti-
cides.' 1 45 Where a state legislature makes explicit its purpose,
that purpose is likely to be infused throughout the agency's
planning and implementation, although its value as a direct
control measure may be slight.
8. Rulemaking Authority
The authority for state pesticide agencies to adopt rules is
the core of the regulatory process. In many cases, rulemaking
authority reiterates the approaches previously described and au-
thorizes more particularized state regulatory control. In other
I" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-435(b) (1983) (emphasis added). See also ALA. CODE §
2-27-51 (1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-1503a (1981); R.I. GEN. LAvs § 23-25-3 (1979);
1975 S.C. Acts No. 220 § 1 (1975); W. VA. CODE § 19-16B-2 (1984). Compare the
somewhat more typical language of the Arkansas and New Hampshire statutes:
The purpose of this Act is to regulate in the public interest the
labeling, distribution, storage, transportation, and disposal of pesticides as
hereinafter defined. Pesticides are valuable to our State's agricultural pro-
duction and to the protection of man and the environment from insects,
rodents, weeds, and other forms of life which may be pests; but it is
essential to the public health and welfare that they be regulated to prevent
adverse effects on human life and the environment. New pesticides are
continually being discovered, synthesized, or developed which are valuable
for the control of pests and for use as defoliants, desiccants, plant regu-
lators, spray adjuvants, and related purposes. However, such pesticides
may be ineffective, may cause injury to man or may cause unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment. Therefore, it is deemed necessary to
provide for regulation of such pesticides.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 77-229 (1981).
The purpose of this chapter is to recognize the benefits of chemical
pesticides in the economy/of the state when applied in a safe, scientific,
and proper manner; to safeguard public health and welfare and public
assets in the soils, waters, forests, wildlife, and other natural resources of
the state by insuring proper application of chemical pesticides; to provide
for the scientific measuring and monitoring of residual pesticides in the
waters and other natural resources of the state, and to establish accurate
records of pesticides use in the state without superseding controls presently
in force.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 149-D:l (1978).
'4 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-437(2) (1983).
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cases the legislature has not itself set a standard for limiting
drift: Instead, drift is explicitly mentioned as a subject for agency
rulemaking-that is, the state legislature has not enacted specific
substantive controls or standards regarding pesticide drift, but
has explicitly authorized the state pesticide agency to promulgate
rules in this regard. The actual regulations adopted are discussed
in the next section of the Article. Such rules will carry the force
and effect of law.
As previously discussed, the Maine legislature sought to ex-
plicitly mandate agency rulemaking in regard to drift. 46 A dis-
cretionary statute is far more common. For example, the
Kentucky statute authorizing rules to lrotect adjacent or nearby
plants (including forage), wildlife, fish, pollinating insects, ani-
mals and persons provides that the department "may prescribe
methods to be used in the application of pesticides" and that
such rules "may relate to the time, place, manner, and method
of application of the pesticides, may restrict or prohibit use of
pesticides in designated areas during specified periods of time
and shall encompass all reasonable factors which the department
deems necessary to prevent damage or injury by drift or mis-
application."'' 47
There are also several more states where rulemaking author-
ity, although not specifically using the word "drift," may be
viewed as intended to deal with drift. These are illustrated by
the Iowa provision which, to assure proper use, allows for
agency regulation of "time, method, and manner" of applica-
tion. 48
See notes 109, 137 supra.
,, KRS § 217B.050(1) (1982) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAi. §
35-10-104 (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1203 (Cum. Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §
5-1505a (1981); MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-21-19 (1973) (hormone-type herbicides); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-458 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 4-35-06(1) (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
23-25-9(e) (1979). For comparative purposes see the more general rulemaking authority
in ALA. CODE § 2-27-8 (1977); ALmASKA STAT. § 46.03.320 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
77-235 (1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-10-118 (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 487.051 (West
1981 & Cum. Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 3-63, 3-85 (West Cum. Supp.
1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 80-8-105 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1F-4 (West 1979);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-9-102 (1981). For a somewhat unusual listing, see OR. REv.
STAT. § 634.306 (1981).
' See IOWA CODE ANN. § 206.19 (West Cum. Supp. 1984). See also, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 2-27-58 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 487.042 (West 1981) (restricted use pesticides);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, § 808 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 281.025
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1984); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 149-D:7 (Cum. Supp. 1983); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 33-0303(3)(e) (McKinney 1984); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §
921.16(A) (Page Supp. 1983); TEx. AGiuc. CODE ANN. § 76-104 (Vernon 1982); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 17-21-030 (1983).
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Also worthy of particular note-not so much as an effort to
limit drift, but as a method to address the potential impact of
drift on others in the area-is the rulemaking authority explicitly
enabling an agency to require notice to be given prior to spray-
ing.' 9 New Mexico legislation, for example, authorizes its pest-
icide agency to establish rules
to notify land owners of property adjoining the property to be
treated, or in the immediate vicinity thereof, of a proposed
application of a pesticide, if such notice is necessary to carry
out the purpose of the Pesticide Control Act, and for a hearing
before the director of the department of any objecting owner
of property adjoining the property to be treated before the
application of the pesticide .... 110
While the above types of rulemaking authority focus on drift
and related problems in the most basic sense, there are other
areas where potential rulemaking may serve to control drift. For
example, statutes which provide for regulations to determine
that certain areas will not be sprayed, or will be sprayed only
under limited conditions, may be addressing the impossibility of
preventing drift in or near these places. The provision in Maine
law which allows for the designation of critical areas is an
example of this type of rulemaking authority.' 5'
There are also statutes which authorize the agency to estab-
lish by rule a permitting system, for example, for restricted use
pesticides or for "special local needs" registrations. 52 Usually
the decision is left to agency discretion; Ohio is an exception
and mandates rulemaking to establish permit requirements. 15 3
This permit-based approach to rulemaking brings into play the
same kinds of considerations noted earlier where the statutes
themselves mandate permits, thus adding the potential for an
extra layer of control for certain areas or uses.
,1 At least one statute was identified where such rulemaking was mandatory rather
than discretionary. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 921.16(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
"- N.M. STAT. ANN. § 76-4-9(A)(5) (1981). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-458(b)
(1983).
,5, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1471-F (1980 & Supp. 1984).
'2 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 15-3-3.5-11 (Burns 1983).
," Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 921.16(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1983). See also VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 6, § 1104(3) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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Rulemaking also parallels statutes in those states which ad-
dress particularly the rulemaking authority to further regulate
equipment. Kansas law is representative:
The secretary, may at his or her discretion, require the regis-
tration of any equipment used in the commercial application
of pesticides, and any equipment required to be so registered
may be marked for identification in a manner prescribed by
the secretary. Unannounced inspections may be made without
charge to determine if the equipment is properly calibrated
and maintained in conformance with laws and rules and reg-
ulations, and the secretary may require repairs or other changes
before its further use for pesticide application. A list of re-
quirements that equipment shall meet may be adopted by rules
and regulations.'5 4
All of these statutory authorizations, for rulemaking as well
as other agency directives, shape the form of pesticide regulation
to be used in each state. Agency implementation of these statutes
is discussed in detail in the next section.
III. STATE REGULATORY APPROACHES TO DR-rr
The preceding section of this Article described the state
statutes which address the control or mitigation of drift or off-
target residues. Under these statutes state pesticide agencies have
been created to serve many functions. Such agencies register and
classify pesticides, issue licenses to persons wishing to apply
pesticides, issue a variety of special or experimental permits,
adopt rules governing aspects of pesticide use, and exercise en-
forcement authority over pesticide use and disposal. Within each
of these functions the agency adopts rules and issues orders and
decisions further amplifying the legislative directives and defining
the mechanisms for assuring that pesticide use in the state is
within the appropriate balance between need for the product
and environmental protection.' 55
"- KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-2456(a) (1982). See also Omno REv. CODE ANN. § 921.16(B)(3)
(Page Supp. 1983). For further discussion of equipment, see notes 121, 135-36 supra.
," This Article does not attempt to review agency procedures or the applicable
provisions of administrative law. Generally speaking, properly adopted agency rules have
the force of law. Accordingly, violation of agency rules subjects the violator to the same
penalties as violation of the statute itself. Most statutes explicitly so provide. See, e.g.,
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In reviewing the approaches of pesticide agencies in this
country and in some of the Canadian provinces, it is difficult
to discern any single state or provincial regulatory program (or
even a particular part thereof) which in and of itself can be said
to control drift. Instead it seems that a reading of the agency
rules as a whole reveals a plethora of initiatives working in a
series of different combinations. Agency efforts regarding drift
are categorized here in five major groups: (1) standards for use;
(2) permitting; (3) licensing; (4) registration and classification;
and (5) enforcement-related activities. 56
A. Standards for Use
As was the case in the statutory discussion in the preceding
section, the most obvious of the agency regulations dealing with
drift or off-target residues are those which either prohibit drift
per se or impose direct limitations or performance standards
intended to control application and drift within specified bounds.
Several state agencies have standards of this type, though there
is a marked difference among them. Some rules are blanket
prohibitions, while others incorporate general and/or specific
standards of care to be exercised. Some prohibit drift where it
results in specified levels of damage; others are written without
apparent regard to proof of harm.
This section reviews state standards designed to prohibit or
minimize drift. While in many states standards of one type tend
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 616 (1979), tit. 22, § 1471-J (1980). See also notes 132-
33 supra. The penalties themselves vary, including both civil and criminal sanctions of
various amounts. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 616(l) (1979), tit. 22, § 1417-
J (1980). See also statutes cited supra note 133. Many statutes also incorporate specific
provisions for injunctive relief for violation of the statute or rules promulgated there-
under. See, e.g., ME. RE. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 616(2) (1979); MICH. Coup. LAws ANN.
§ 286.576 (West 1979). In addition, many states provide that violation of the statute or
rules may be grounds for license revocation. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
1471-D(8)(E) (1980). See generally note 108 supra and accompanying text. In a variation
of this last penalty, some state rules provide that certain violations are negligence per
se. See, e.g., Wis. ADm. CODE AG. § 29.15(1)(b) (1982); 302 Ky. ADrnuN. REas. 31:005(14)
(1984) [hereinafter cited as KAR]. In these and other states negligence (generally phrased
as operation in a faulty, careless, or negligent manner) is again grounds for license
revocation. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1471-D(8)(C) (1980).
1-6 Perhaps the best that can be said about these divisions is that they are somewhat
arbitrary. Consequently, it must be kept in mind that regulatory approaches discussed
in one category have implications related to, or synergistic with, those listed in another.
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to merge with another, for purposes of discussion, these are
reviewed in four subcategories: (1) those which purport to pre-
clude overspray or drift completely; (2) those which prohibit
drift which causes injury at some delineated level; (3) those which
attempt to control drift by establishing a general standard of
care to be exercised by applicators; and (4) those which provide
specific standards for applicator performance.
1. Prohibition
The District of Columbia has perhaps the most absolute
attempt to regulate drift through a prohibitory standard. Al-
though referring to wind velocity, the District's rules incorporate
neither a standard of reasonableness nor a requisite of damage
before providing that "[no pesticide application shall be made
by air or ground equipment at such a time as the wind velocity
will cause a pesticide to drift beyond the target area." '57 A
variation on the District's approach is the Arizona regulation
for highly toxic pesticides which indicates that "all persons and
livestock must be removed from the area to be treated and drift
onto adjacent dwellings, fields, where livestock are feeding or
onto other crops, must be avoided."' 58 Yet another variation on
the theme is the Connecticut rule which requires a written release
for aerial application of pesticides and fertilizers (other than
B.t.) from "any landowner or resident whose property is under
the spray pattern of the aerial application or subject to drift
from such application."''5 9 The Connecticut rules then define
"subject to drift" as a minimum of 200 feet from the flight
path of a helicopter and 300 feet from the flight path of a fixed
wing aircraft.160
2. Injury or Damage
While somewhat less prohibitory in tone than the preceding
approaches, Ohio and New Hampshire use a combination of
"I DISTRICT OF COLUwMBA REGULATIONS, STANDARDS PERTAINING TO THE PESTICIDE
OPERATIONS ACT, § 17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as D.C. REG.].
19 ARIz. ADMIN. Comp. R. § R3-10-74.13 (1983).
119 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 22a-66-7(g)(1) (emphasis added). For Bacillus thurin-




rules that limits pesticide drift in almost absolute terms. New
Hampshire is illustrative. First, a general rule is set out which
prohibits pesticide application "in a manner that causes or may
tend to cause unreasonable damage to non-target areas or un-
reasonable harm or injury to persons." 161 In further explanation,
New Hampshire adds: "Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, an 'unreasonable' amount of drift may be that which
causes a violation of the food tolerance established by the USDA/
FDA.' ' 62 Then New Hampshire defines other limits which do
not incorporate the reasonableness standard: As to crops and
pasturage, pesticide applications in "adjacent" areas "shall be
such that contamination of crops or pasturage does not oc-
cur."' 163 As to drift generally, New Hampshire rules indicate:
"No application of pesticides shall be made by mechanically
powered equipment at such times as the wind velocity shall cause
a hazardous chemical to drift beyond the target area."' 64 The
New Hampshire Pesticide Board has interpreted the latter stand-
ard to mean "zero drift." 65
Beyond these absolutist provisions, many state agencies reg-
ulate drift with reference to injury or harm. For example, Ala-
bama is one of two states identified as using the word "trespass"
in a drift standard. The Alabama rule provides:
No person shall dispense or cause to be dispensed from aircraft
or ground equipment engaged in custom pesticide application
any pesticide:
(1) Under such conditions that would result in the applied
pesticide trespassing outside of the target area in sufficient
N.H. ADMIN. CODE 502.02 (1980). See also OHio ADMIN. CODE § 901:5-11-02(C)
(1977) which provides:
No person shall operate equipment for the application of pesticides, in-
cluding such auxiliary equipment as hoses and metering devices, in such
condition or in such manner as to create a hazard from leaking, spillage,
dripping, backflow, vapors or drift and thereby create a hazard to the
health and safety of the public or to animals or wildlife.
"6 N.H. ADMIN. CODE 502.02 (1980).
"I N.H. ADMIN. CODE 502.04 (1974).
Im N.H. ADMIN. CODE 502.06 (1974). See also N.H. ADMIN. CODE 701.05 (1982)
(encapsulated methyl parathion shall not be allowed to drift). Ohio has a similar
provision for contamination of crops. See Omo ADrMN. CODE § 901:5-11-02(F) (1977).
165 Telephone interview with Robert Cheney, New Hampshire Attorney General's
Office, Concord, NH. However, representatives of New Hampshire at the North Amer-
ican Conference on Pesticide Spray Drift and Chemical Trespass (Portland, Me., 1984)
reported that New Hampshire is considering amending its current rules.
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quantities and under such circumstances that would injure,
damage, destroy or render unfit for their intended use, plants,
animals, wildlife, aquatic environments and their inhabitants,
man and other inhabitants of the nontarget environments.
66
Washington, New York and Maryland regulations are quite
similar to the Alabama provisions. Under Washington's rules,
application of pesticides is prohibited where "weather conditions
are such that physical drift or volatization may cause damage to
adjacent land, including humans, desirable plants or animals."' 67
Under New York's rules, pesticides are to be used "in such a
manner and under such wind and other conditions as to prevent
contamination of crops, property, structures, lands, pasturage
or waters adjacent to the area of application."'' 68 Maryland's
approach is similar in requiring that "[a]ll reasonable precau-
tions shall be observed in the handling, use, and secure storage
of pesticides and disposal of containers so that man or other
non-target areas or organisms will not suffer undue injury and
so that hazardous environmental contamination does not oc-
cur."1 69
These three states illustrate the use of a fairly general stand-
ard, leaving it up to the applicator to define the conditions when
drift may be likely to occur and prohibiting application in those
conditions where damage results; that is, in New York where
"contamination would occur";' 70 in Alabama, where drift "would
injure, damage, destroy or render unfit" specified nontarget
organisms; or, in the case of Maryland, where "undue injury"
or "hazardous environmental contamination" results.'
71
"6 ALABAMA REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE CUSTOM APPLICATION OF PESTICIDES AND
GROUND EQUIPMENT, § 6(b)(1)-(2) (1974) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as ALA.
RaG.].
'6 WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 16-228-185(4) (1977).
'14 N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 325.2(a) (1977) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. REG.].
Compare the Vermont language: "Pesticide applicators must use pesticides and conduct
operations under conditions known to minimize contamination of non-target lands and
water areas." VERMONT REGULATIONS FOR CONTROL OF PESTICIDES § IV.l.b (1981)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as VT. REG.].
,9 MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE REGULATIONS tit. 15, subtit. 5, ch. 01,
§ 12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MD. REG.]. Cf. MAss. ADM. CODE tit. 222, § 10.03(1 1)
(1983).
110 New York defines contamination as "the presence of a pesticide or pesticides,
in or on areas other than the target area, in quantities which are or may be injurious
to man or the environment." N.Y. REG. § 325.1(1) (1977).
"' See statutes cited supra notes 166-69.
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New Jersey's rules are an amalgamation of the damage or
injury standard and the California "due care" approach dis-
cussed in the next section. The New Jersey regulations, which
apparently were the subject of significant controversy, 172 require
efforts to avoid or minimize drift or off-target residues as fol-
lows:
(b) No person shall transport, handle, store, mix or load
any pesticide or pesticide container in a manner that causes
harm or injury to persons or the environment, or a significant
risk of injury or damage.
(c) No person shall apply pesticides in a manner that
causes damage to non-target sites, harm or injury to persons
or the environment, or a significant risk of injury or damage.
(d) No person shall directly apply any pesticide to a non-
target site.
(e) No person shall make any application of a pesticide
unless he takes reasonable precautions before, during and after
the application to minimize exposure of individuals to the
pesticide and insure the safety of any individuals necessarily ex-
posed ....
(f) No person shall make an application of a pesticide to
a target site in such a manner or under such conditions that drift
which is avoidable through reasonable precautions infringes on
a non-target site.'"
Within these regulations setting out a "reasonable" standard
of care, New Jersey also incorporates, in paragraphs (b) and (c)
quoted above, the standard of "significant risk of injury or
damage." This term is defined by rule as a "potential for injury
or damage which is not purely remote or highly speculative, but
capable of being perceived or recognized based on the location,
type and amount of pesticide involved, and available scientific
information about the pesticide and its effects on persons, prop-
erty and the environment.' ' -174 Accordingly, it appears that in a
direct application to a nontarget site, damage is not considered
in determining whether a violation of New Jersey law has oc-
curred. Also, reasonable precautions are required under para-
172 Coalition Against Toxics v. Hughey, No. A-3942-82TS (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1982).
' N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7:30-10.6(b)-(f).
174 N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7:30-10.1.
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graphs (c) and (f) apparently without regard to a measure of
damages. However, general use and application incorporate a
damage criterion whereby, absent at least a significant risk of
injury or damage, the law is not violated when pesticides are
applied with reasonable precautions.
Wisconsin presents another variation in the manner in which
it regulates drift. Much like New Jersey, Wisconsin recognizes a
distinction between direct and indirect spray. 75 Also like New
Jersey, Wisconsin then seeks to define "significant risk of injury
or damage" from drift as "a potential for injury or damage
which is not purely remote or highly speculative, but capable of
being perceived or recognized based on the location, type and
amount of pesticide involved, and available scientific informa-
tion about the pesticide and its effects on persons, property and
the environment.' '176
Given these definitions, Wisconsin's rules then declare certain
applications or results to be negligent:
(b) Any use resulting in pesticide drift is negligent, and
prohibited under par. (a), if it causes injury or damage, or
creates a significant risk of injury or damage to other persons
or their property, or wild animals other than those declared
pests under s.AG 29.02. In any judicial or administrative en-
forcement action or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the
department for violation of this subsection, proof of pesticide
drift shall be prima facie evidence of a significant risk of
injury or damage to other persons, their property and wild
animals.
(c) Any use resulting in pesticide overspray is negligent,
and prohibited under par. (a), regardless of whether it causes
,'5 Wisconsin defines pesticide drift as "the drifting or movement of pesticides by
air currents or diffusion onto property beyond the boundaries of the target area to be
treated with pesticides, other than by pesticide overspray," and indicates in the definition
that, in the absence of evidence of "pesticide overspray," an application "beyond the
boundaries of the target area shall be considered to be the result of pesticide drift."
Wis. AonttN. CODE [Ag.] § 29.01(22) (1982). "Pesticide overspray" is then defined as
an "application of pesticides onto property beyond the boundaries of the target area to
be treated, by the failure to control the direct flow or application of pesticides from the
application equipment, under surrounding conditions of use and application, so as to
confine the pesticide to the target area." Wis. ADxM. CODE [Ag.] § 29.01(23) (1982).
116 Wis. AD mN. CODE [Ag.] § 29.01(33) (1982).
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injury or damage, or creates a significant risk of injury or
damage to other persons, their property, or wild animals.'7
It appears that proof of drift, at least in enforcement actions,
establishes a presumption of harm; while, in overspray situa-
tions, no harm need be proved. 78 By incorporating explicitly the
statutory negligence standard, Wisconsin establishes that pesti-
cide drift and pesticide overspray are grounds for imposition of
penalties. 179
3. General Standard of Care
California law also incorporates a general standard as to the
amount of drift that will be acceptable, but it does so in a
slightly different fashion than the state provisions discussed in
the preceding subsection. California statutes require that the use
of any pesticide shall be in a manner "to prevent substantial
drift,"8 0 with "substantial drift" being defined by regulation as
that amount of drift in which the "quantity of pesticide outside
of the area treated is greater than that which would have resulted
had the applicator used due care."'' California then requires as
a standard of care that those performing pest control "shall...
exercise reasonable precautions to avoid contamination of the
environment.' '182
The California regulations incorporate the legal standard of
negligence by reference to reasonable precautions and due care.
California then prescribes more specifically when-to avoid
drift-pesticide application shall not be made or allowed to
continue:
All applicators prior to and while applying a pesticide shall
evaluate the equipment to be used, meteorological conditions,
the property to be treated and surrounding properties to de-
termine the likelihood of harm or damage. Notwithstanding
'7 Wis. ADMIN. CODE [Ag.] § 29.15(1)(b)(c) (1982).
" Compare Wis. ADMIN. CODE [Ag.] § 29.15(b) (1982) with Wis. ADMIN. CODE
[Ag.] § 29.15(c) (1982).
,71 See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 94.71 (West 1972).
'Io CALIF. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 12972 (1978).
181 CALIF. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 6000 (1983).
In CALIF. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 6600 (1983).
[Vol. 73
CHEIcAL TRESPASS
that substantial drift will be prevented, no pesticide application
shall be made or continued when:
(b) There is a reasonable possibility of damage to non-
target crops, animals or other public or private property; or
(c) There is a reasonable possibility of contamination of
nontarget public or private property, including the creation of
a health hazard, preventing normal use of such property. In
determining a health hazard, the amount and toxicity of the
pesticide, the type and uses of the property and related factors
shall be considered. 83
The preceding generic provisions are sometimes applied with
reference to more limited situations. For example, Rhode Island
rules address drift in relation to "lands near or adjacent to
public water supplies," to "areas adjacent to crops or pastur-
age," and lands adjacent to "pesticide applications for agricul-
tural purposes."'"
4. Performance Standards
A more direct approach is used in North Carolina which
prescribes detailed, substantive performance standards to set the
minimum amount of care necessary to prevent drift. North
Carolina rules regarding aerial application of pesticides first
require the pilot to learn and confirm the boundaries and loca-
tion of the target area, to identify nontarget areas that might
present problems, and to assure that equipment has appropriate
shutoffs so as "not to create a hazard from vapor or drift.' '1 85
Second, the rules set a general standard prohibiting any person
from aerially applying pesticides "under such conditions that
drift ... will cause adverse effect."'18 6 The rules also require
"' CALIF. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 6614 (1983).
' , RHODE ISLAND PESTICIDE CONTROL ACT RULES, Rule 0(2), (6), (7), (10) (1976)
[hereinafter cited as R.I. REG.]. Rhode Island rules also prohibit application by me-
chanically powered equipment "at such times as the wind velocity will cause a hazardous
chemical to drift beyond the target area." R.I. REG. Rule 0(10). See also 3 MIN. CODE
AGENCY R. § 1.0338.H (1978).
,S See N.C. ADMIN. CODE § .1002(d)(g) (1983). West Virginia has similar provisions.
See W. VA. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS, STATE DEPT. OF AGRCUrLTURE, c. 19-16B, §§
30-31 (1981) [hereinafter cited as W. VA. REG.].
'- N.C. ADMIN. CODE § .1003(2) (1983).
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specific nozzle spacing, height above target and, for certain
products, prescribed disks, pressures, nozzles and droplet sizes.8 7
North Carolina now has proposed to amend its rules to include,
among other changes, a specific requirement that "applicators
shall be required to control drift" and an explicit recognition
that the standards set out are a minimum. 88
North Carolina's rules are among the most detailed in the
requirements imposed to avoid or decrease drift or off-target
spray. Some of the same types of performance standards appear
in the regulations of other states, though not necessarily in the
"I N.C. ADMN. CODE § .1003 (1983). These standards are applicable according to
their terms to phenoxy herbicides, paraquat, picloram and to other restricted-use pesti-
cides. See N.C. ADmiN. CODE § .1003(4)(5) (1983).
' The 1984 proposed amendments to N.C. ADMIN. CODE § .1003 provide:
To control drift, it shall be required that all aerial applicators of liquid
pesticide formulations include and utilize in their schedules and procedures
the following methods:
(1) Fixed nozzles shall be spaced on the boom to afford a uniform
spray pattern at the height the aircraft will be flown.
(2) No person shall apply a pesticide aerially under such conditions
that drift from the application will cause adverse effect.
(3) All pesticides applied aerially shall be released within 10 feet above
the target, except where obstructions in or adjacent to the target would
endanger the safety of the pilot while applying pesticides at that altitude.
This restriction shall not apply to ultra-low volume (ULV) application.
(4) All applications of the following liquid pesticide formulations shall
be made using a D4 or larger disk with a 46 whirlplate with the discharge
directed with the airstream or not more than 10 degrees below the
horizontal, and operated at a maximum pressure of 40 pounds per
square inch, or a system producing a droplet size range not smaller
than the above system, except for rotary-wing aircraft flying at speeds
of 60 mph or less, in which case the nozzles may be directed downward:
(a) phenoxyherbicides, (b) paraquat, (c) picloram (Tordon).
(5) All applications of restricted-use pesticides other than those spec-
ified in (4) of this Rule shall be made using one of the procedures
below:
(a) use a D4 or larger disk with a 45 whirlplate with the discharge
directed with the airstream or not more than 10 degrees below the
horizontal, and operated at a maximum pressure of 40 pounds per
square inch, or a system producing a droplet size range not smaller
than the above system, except for rotary-wing aircraft flying at
speeds of 60 mph or less, in which case the nozzles may be directed
downward; or
(b) use a boom with outside nozzles placed no closer to the wingtips
than 12-1/2 percent of the total wingspan distance. If the length of
the boom of the spraying equipment exceeds the nozzle span, a
bleeder line shall be provided from the end of the boom to the last
nozzle on the boom.
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explicit context of drift control. Such performance standards
may cover a wide variety of subjects including equipment, prod-
uct, wind and weather conditions, applicator restrictions and the
like. Different states use different combinations of standards
and apply them in a variety of circumstances. While there are
states where some type of standard is generally applicable'8 9
specific performance standards involving product dilution,
equipment and weather conditions are most often set for specific
herbicides or categories of herbicides.190
The Arkansas rules for the application of "restricted herbi-
cides," especially the control of certain hormone-type herbicides
near cotton, are within this last category and are among the
more intricate of the agency performance standards reviewed.
The Arkansas approach is informative in its detail and in the
tiered structure of its restrictions.
The Arkansas rules involve 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T and other hor-
mone-type herbicides.' 9' Most stringent is the prohibition of use
of these restricted herbicides by dusting, except by hand equip-
ment for lawns.192 Next, permits are required for other uses. For
example, the use of esters, except for low-volatile esters, requires
a written permit from the director of the Arkansas State Plant
Board. 93 After these restrictions, the products can be used only
if application is consistent with very detailed standards, the
stringency of which varies according to the location within the
state. Specifically, the state is divided into two zones in order
to tailor the application conditions to the cotton plantings. 94
Restrictions imposed include recordkeeping, spot checking, buff-
M Minnesota regulations provide that "[n]o person shall use, store, display, or
handle any pesticide or container thereof in any manner inconsistent with labeling or so
as to endanger humans, damage agricultural products, food, livestock, wildlife, polli-
nating insects, or pollute the environment." Minnesota regulations also require that
pesticides be applied "in good workmanlike manner utilizing a pattern that will give
uniform distribution of pesticides without creating hazard to non-target areas." See 3
MINN. CODE AGENCY R. § 1.0338.H (1978).
" See, e.g., ARKANSAS STATE PLANT BOARD REGULATIONS ON 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T AND
OTHER HORMONE-TYPE HERBICIDES, § 4.5, 4.9 (1977) (all aerial spraying) [hereinafter
cited as ARK. REG.]; IDAHO PESTICIDE USE APPLICATION RULES & REGULATIONS § 17
(1981) [hereinafter cited as IDAHO REG.]; LOUISIANA DEPT. OF AGRiC. RULES & REGS. §
12.1 [hereinafter cited as LA. REG.].
'9' ARK. REG. ON 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T AND OTHER HORMONE-TYPE HERBICIDES (1977).
' ARK. REG. § 4.2 (1977).
ARK. REG. § 4.3 (1977).
'9, ARK. REG. § 4.9 (1977).
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ers around susceptible crops (commercial plantings of cotton,
tomatoes, grapes and okra) and notice. 195 As to performance
standards, requirements are established for mixture of spray
solution, nozzle placement and angles, airplane turning, wind
velocity and aircraft equipment systems. 96
The state of Washington also has a spectrum of rules gov-
erning the application of pesticides, particularly herbicides. These
rules vary from county to county, imposing a diverse scheme of
requirements including weather, time of spraying, equipment
calibration and notice standards. 197
Other states use at least part of the Arkansas or Washington
approach, most often in regard to particular herbicides. Like
Washington, Texas has regulations tailored to various coun-
ties; 19 California has established performance standards for
equipment, products and weather for specified herbicides;' 99 Mis-
sissippi sets out standards for pesticide mixture requirements,
wind speed and height of application for herbicides; 2°° and West
Virginia, using a similar approach, also includes a requirement
for pilot reconnaissance of the intended application site before
spraying.2 0'
,91 See ARK. REG. §§ 4.4; 4.6; 4.8; 4.9.B.1 (1977).
11 See, e.g., ARK. REG. § 4.9 (1977).
'9 The scope of the Washington rules is shown by the subjects covered. See
Washington Pesticide Control Act, ch. 15.58 (1983); Washington Pesticide Application,
ch. 17.21 (1982); WASH. ADMN. CODE R. 16-228-010 to 16-228-330 (1984) (General
Pesticide Regulations) (Regulations Relating to 2,4-D Pesticides, Statewide); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE R. 16-230-600 to 16-230-675 (1980). The following is a list of rules,
regulations and orders for which citations are unavailable: Regulations Pertaining to the
Use of Insecticides on Corn in Eastern Washington; Rules Relating to Desiccants and
Defoliants, Eastern Washington; Rules Relating to the Use of Endrin in Apple Orchards;
Regulations Relating to Heptachlor Treated Grain Feed; Order No. 1137 (DDT, DDD)
(1970); Order No. 1127 (Lindane) (1969); Order No. 1633 (Picloram) (1979); Order No.
1596 (Microencapsulated Methyl Parathion) (1979); Summary of Eastern Washington
2,4-D Restrictions; Order No. 1426, Regulations Pertaining to Blossoming Alfalfa,
Clover and Mint (1975).
Also there are separate regulations relating to 2,4-D restrictions for the following
counties: Columbia, Yakima, Spokane, Lincoln, Grant, Adams, Benton, Douglas &
Chelon, Franklin, Garfield, Klickitat, Okanogan, Walla Walla and Whitman.
'" See HERBICIDE REGULATIONS OF THE TEXAs DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE § 11.2
(1983). See also IDAHO REG. § 17 (1981) (phenoxy herbicide restrictions).
199 See, e.g., CALIF. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 2458 (1982).
See Mississippi REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF HORMONE-TYPE
HERBICIDES By AIRCRAFT, §§ 2-7 (1974).
' See W. VA. REG. ch. 19-16B, §§ 29-36 (1981).
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It is also fairly common for performance standards to be
applied to particular kinds and uses of equipment. North Dakota
rules, for example, set out a general standard of care requiring
all pesticide equipment to "be operationally sound and properly
calibrated so as to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment. "202
Other states are more definitive. Minnesota provides specific
standards for aircraft equipment,2 03 and Idaho prescribes limi-
tations on the use of aircraft by establishing a maximum wind
velocity and regulating turning or low flying. 2°4 A few states also
provide specified standards for ground equipment. 20 1
Another focus of agency rules is the establishment of buffer
zones. The buffer zone concept was alluded to in the previous
discussions of certain FIFRA special exemptions, Oregon's spray-
free areas and Arkansas's herbicide restrictions. 206 The idea is
obvious. Because drift may be impossible to prevent, a spray-
free area is established as a buffer around particularly sensitive
areas. As was the case with some of the more general perform-
ance standards, buffers are imposed under a variety of circum-
stances. While different states have different concerns, areas apt
to be protected typically include schools, dwellings, water bodies
or susceptible crops, with the extent of buffers depending on the
nature of the site and the pesticide product involved. 20 7
Variations are illustrated by a broad overview of several
states. The Arkansas restricted herbicide rules provide for one-
mile buffers for susceptible crops from April 15 to October 1 in
some areas and, absent notification, 1/4 mile at other times in
22 N.D. R4-25-05, § 05.1-3 (1976). See also N.Y. REG. § 325.27 (1977); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE R. 16-228-190(5)-(6) (1977).
" 3 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. § 1-0339.A-10 (1978); WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 16-
230-180 (1980) (thermometers/inversion).
20' IDAHO REG. §§ 8-9 (1981). See also ARiz. ADMIN. COMP. R. § R3-10-74(11)
(1983) (stating that in applying highly toxic pesticides "whenever possible, pilots should
fly cross-wind, beginning at the downwind side of the field so that drift will be dispersed
on return swath"). Likewise, Texas herbicide rules and certain Washington rules deal
explicitly with wind, time and weather conditions.
See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 16-230-160 (1980) (desiccants and defoliants).
2 See notes 110-18 supra and accompanying text.
" See generally notes 208-14 infra. In a few instances the courts have also directly
or indirectly considered buffer zones as an indication of the adequacy of precautions




other areas. 208 Idaho precludes phenoxy herbicides in some coun-
ties and provides a five-mile buffer from susceptible crops in
others. 209 Arizona provides for buffers around schools (1/4 mile)
and dwellings (100-300 feet except with written permission) where
"highly toxic" pesticides are applied. 210 It is not uncommon for
these buffers to be established for a single product (such as
Temik near certain water supplies in Maine"), or to protect a
special use (as is the case with blueberries in New Jersey212 or
vineyards in Washington21 ). One of the most extensive and
precise lists of buffers is that set out in West Virginia regulations
for picloram, dicamba, and other herbicide formulations.
214
Often buffer zones are related to notice or consent. This
concept acknowledges that, while it may be impossible to prevent
drift, at least unconsenting (or unknowing) exposure may be
lessened or eliminated. The Arkansas and Arizona provisions
are examples of requirements of several states where buffers are
imposed in the absence of notice to, and permission of, the
landowner.215
Regulations of still other states do not require consent or
buffers, but do require notice.21 6 In some instances posting may
be required;217 in others, notice is given only to the agriculture
201 ARK. REG. § 4.9.B.1-2 (1977).
... IDAHO REG. § 17 (1981). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 16-228-260 (1983)
(application of endrin restricted to a swath of four feet on each side of apple tree rows).
210 ARIZ. ADMIN. COMP. R. §§ R3-10-77 to -79 (1983).
2M, ME. REG. 01-026, ch. 41, 1(B) (1984).
112 N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7:30-10.6(1).
213 WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 16-230-665 (1980).
114 W. VA. REG. ch. 19, § 31 A-B (1981).
2I See notes 208, 210 supra and accompanying text. See also WAsH. ADMIN. CODE
R. 16-231-001 (1980) (application of 2,4-D in certain counties).
216 In some instances, notice is required in conjunction with a permit process. See,
e.g., CONN. AGENcIEs REGS. § 22a-66-7(g)(2) (aerial application of B.t.). On a few
occasions the courts have also discussed the obligation of a person using pesticides to
give notice or warning to others of his or her intention to spray. Such an obligation
was found to exist and to be the basis for assessing liability where the landowner, who
knew that cattle pastured on an unfenced strip of his property, failed to warn the owner
of the cattle prior to spraying a product known to be harmful to the animals. See
Hopkins v. Ravalli County Elec. Coop., Inc., 395 P.2d 106 (Mont. 1964). See also Hall
v. C & A Navarra Ranch, Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Lenk v. Spezia,
213 P.2d 47, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540, 550
(WVis. 1984). Required notice has also arisen in the context of federal litigation. See,
e.g., Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1983).
217 See, e.g., MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 333, § 10.03(20) (1983); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
R. 16-228-265 (1983) (endrin).
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department or to some governmental entity.218 More often, notice
is required for neighbors or for the public generally, with dif-
ferent requirements applying in different circumstances in dif-
ferent states.21 9
Massachusetts's notice requirements are illustrative of one
group of standards. For nonagricultural applications of restricted
or limited use pesticides to areas in excess of twenty-five acres,
notice must be given "by the applicator to members of the
public residing on lands within the target area or on adjacent
lands by publication of a timely notice in a newspaper of general
circulation in the municipality affected." 220 For other nonagri-
cultural applications notice of the proposed application must be
given "by the person or entity initiating said application to the
public residing on adjacent lands by publication of a notice in
a newspaper of general circulation normally used by the munic-
ipality for legal notices not later than two (2) days before the
application and no sooner than ten (10) days before applica-
tion.'' 221 The regulations here specify that the notice must "in-
clude the purpose of the control program, the general location
of the control area, the control material to be used, the antici-
pated commencement date and time of the control program, and
the name and telephone number of an individual from whom
further information can be obtained." ' For "agricultural use
of a restricted or state limited use pesticide on ten (10) or more
acres of land, when the treated area is within fifty (50) feet of
a public road, or on land with four hundred fifty (450) feet of
frontage on a public road," Massachusetts regulations require
public notice by posting. 223 The signs must state "Caution, Re-
"' See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. 4.10.901(3) (1982) (endrin); IowA ADMIN. CODE §
400-37.2 (455B) (1977) (county supervisors/roadside).
219 Cf. ME. REG. 01-001, ch. 51, § 2 (1984) 01-001, ch. (unnumbered) § 3 (1981)
(trichlorfon); MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 333 § 10.03 (19)-(21) (1983); N.J. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 7, § 7:30-10.9, -10.11; Omo ADMIN. CODE 901:5-11-02(E), :5-11-04 (1977); VT. REG.
§ IV(4) (1981); DIVISION OF PEsTIcmEs, Ky. DEPT. OF AGRIC., AERIAL RIGHT-OF-WAY
APPLICATION.
21 MASs. ADMIN. CODE tit. 333, § 10.03(19)(b)(1983). Such applications also require
prior notice to and approval of the Department. MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 333, §
10.03(19)(a) (1983).
21 MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 333, § 10.03(21) (1983).
2 MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 333, § 10.03(21) (1983).
MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 333, § 10.03(20) (1983).
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stricted Pesticide in Use" and must be posted "at least every
two hundred (200) feet and at every principle entrance fronting
on a public road. The signs shall comply to size, color, print
size, and other standards established by the Department.' '224
In a parallel manner, Vermont and West Virginia have reg-
ulations that require notice prior to right-of-way spraying. 22
Proposals have been made in Vermont to make the notice re-
quirement more precise;226 current rules mandate:
b. After applying for a permit to use herbicides on a
right-of-way, the permit applicant shall publish a notice of his
intent to use herbicides which satisfies the following crite-
ria....
c. In addition to newspaper advertisements, the permit
applicant shall provide notification by one of the following
methods:
(1) by three (3) spot messages per day on each of two (2)
radio stations in the area of spraying...
(2) by U.S. mail to residents adjacent to the right-of-way
(3) by a personally delivered printed statement to resi-
dents of property adjacent to the right-of-way ...-7
Still other types of notice requirements are suggested by the
New Jersey provisions for public notice prior to community or
area-wide spray applications where the applications include ag-
gregate areas greater than three acres which are part of a gov-
ernmental pesticide control program or which are controlled by
one person s.2 2  Also noteworthy are the Maine provisions for
224 MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 333, § 10.03(20) (1983).
"I See VT. REG. § IV.(4).b,c (1981); W. VA. REG. ch. 19, § 29.A (1981).
21 Proposed regulations amending VT. REG. § IV.4 (1983) would provide that in
order to receive permits to use herbicides on a right-of-way, applicants must provide
notice, in addition to newspaper advertisements, by one of the following methods: "(1)
by three (3) spot messages per day on each of two (2) radio stations in the area of
spraying ... (2) by U.S. mail to residents adjacent to the right-of-way ... [or] (3) by
a personally delivered printed statement to residents of property adjacent to the right-
of-way. ....
VT. REG. § IV.(4).b,c (1981).
2- See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7:30-10.1, -10.9. Note that agricultural spraying
is exempted from the notice section. N.J. ADIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7:30-10.9(b).
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notice in regard to Captan and Dylox spraying.229 While these
provisions indicate a wide variety of situations where notice has
been required, perhaps the most common is the regulatory con-
cern with protection of bees. Notice to apiarists is frequently
mandated and is likely to involve fairly elaborate systems for
assuring contact is made.?0
In some instances rules as to mandatory notice are designed
to create communication of sorts with those who may be affected
by the spray. The Maine Captan and Dylox rules, for example,
contemplate that following the required notice, the individual
parties will make arrangements for more specific notice.2' Sim-
ilarly, the Vermont rules provide an opportunity for landowners
to have their water supplies marked on right-of-way spraying
maps and the areas flagged.232
These latter opportunities, created by regulation, are merely
lesser variations on the Massachusetts rules which combine buffer,
notice and consent concepts in allowing individuals to be ex-
cluded from spray areas upon following the specified proce-
dures. 233 For example, once an area is so designated, the rules




As discussed in regard to statutory permitting requirements
in the preceding section, permits are a way to focus governmental
and public attention on a particular application.235 Pesticide
29 Notice is required for these products and content of the notice is specified by
rule. ME. REG. 01-001, ch.51, 2 (1981), 01-026, ch. (unnumbered), § 3 (1981) (trichlor-
fon).
. See, e.g., IowA ADMIN. CODE § 30-10.31 (206) (1982); MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit.
333 § 10.03(13) (1983); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:30-10.11; N.C. ADMIN. CODE § .1009
(1983).
I' See, e.g., ME. REG. 01-001, c.51, 2.C (1981).
r VT. REaG. § IV.(4).d (1981).
" MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 333 § 10.03(22) (1983). Some areas cannot be excluded,
namely those where a significant threat to public health or agriculture is involved. MAss.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 333 § 10.03(22)(b) (1983).
MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 333, § 10.03(22)(a)(2) (1983).
' "Permit" as used here does not include licensing or certification of applicators
discussed beginning at note 247 infra and accompanying text. See also note 88 supra.
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agencies require permits in a series of situations.2 16 These include:
permits for specific sites237 (most notably water bodies238 and
rights-of-way239); permits for specific products (most typically
herbicides240 or restricted use pesticides241); permits to be obtained
for specific kinds of application (such as aerial applications242);
as well as an assortment of more individualized situations.2 43
Generally speaking, the permit process itself can be valuable
in raising awareness of drift problems. For example, to get a
permit for agricultural use of a restricted material in California,
applicants must first identify all known areas that could be
adversely affected by use of the pesticide(s), "including ...
hospitals, schools and playgrounds, residential areas ... water-
ways .. . livestock and crops." ' 244 This assures that applicants
have familiarized themselves-with the area.
236 See generally N.H. ADMIN. CODE § 101.21 (1980) (defining "special permit").
While several types of permits are described here, the discussion of experimental use
permits is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 136c (1980); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 608 (1979 & 1982-83 Supp.); 40 C.F.R. pt. 172 (1983). See
also note 119 supra.
23 See notes 238-39 infra. See also, e.g., N.H. ADMIN. CODE, § 505.03 (1974)
(woodland tracts of 50 acres); N.C. ADMIN. CODE § .1005(a) (1983) (application in
congested area by aircraft).
21 See, e.g., N.H. ADMIN. CODE § 502.10 (1974).
2 See, e.g., N.H. ADMIN. CODE § 505.02 (1977); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 901:5-11-
02(M) (1977); VT. REG. § IV.(4)(a) (1981).
240 See, e.g., ARK. REG. § 4.3 (1977) (esters); CAL. ADMIN. CODE art. 20 (1982);
N.M. Pesticide Control Act Regulatory Order No. 9, RIO (1979) (hormone-type herbi-
cides).
2I See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE art. 20 (1982) (restricted materials); CoLo. PESTI-
CIDE ACT REG. XV(C)-(D) (limited use products); HAWAII REG. § 4-66-64 (1981); Omo
ADMIN. CODE § 901:5-11-02(N)(1977)(rodenticide, avicide, vertebrate repellents applied
by aircraft); OR. ADIN. R. §§ 603-57-301, 603-57-320 (1982) (2,4-D); Wis. ADMIN.
CODE [Ag.] § 29.04 (1982).
' See, e.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 22a-54-1 (1971); HAWAII REG. § 4-66-64(a)
(1981) (restricted product application by aircraft); N.H. ADMIN. CODE § 502.05 (1974);
R.I. REG. Rule 0, 9; VT. REG. § IV.5(c) (1981). Connecticut's rules, which are among
the most stringent in this regard, provide: "No permit for the application of broad
spectrum chemical pesticides from the air for non-agricultural purposes shall be issued
by the commissioner of the department of environmental protection." Agricultural use
requires a permit to be issued "only after the applicant has produced evidence satisfactory
to the commissioner that the proposed material and its method of application shall not
be injurious to the public health, aquatic and animal life, including pollinating insects,
or property not owned or leased by the applicant on whose behalf the application is
made." CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 22a-54-1 (1971).
14 See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7:30-10.2(a) (mosquito permit program).
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 2452(j)(5) (1982). See also HAWAII REG. § 4-66-
64(a)(2) (1981).
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In a like way, Alaska's prerequisites assure, in more general
terms, that specific attention has been paid to the planned pre-
cautions and to applicators' qualifications:
The department will deny an application for a permit to
apply a pesticide if:
(2) the minimum planned precautions are inadequate to
protect the public health or safety, or the environment; [or]
(3) the applicant has failed to furnish evidence to the
department that persons directing, conducting, or participating
in pesticide projects have a working knowledge of the pesticide
to be used, the necessary safety precautions, and the potential
impact of the application on the environment .... 24
The permit process also serves as a regulatory tool to impose
conditions in certain situations. The Wisconsin standards for
issuing permits are illuminating in this regard.
The standards allow issuance of a permit only when the
regulatory agency has determined that a pesticide will be used
with reasonable safety and without unreasonable hazard to the
ecosystem. The standards also allow the agency to impose spe-
cific conditions and limitations on emergency use permits. 246
C. Licensing
Agency regulations further define the statutory standards for
certification of applicators. The approaches follow the federal
241 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE § 90.055(3)(2)-(3) (1978). Accord HAWAII RG. § 4-66-
64(a)(2) (1974).
1* Wis. ADMTIN. CODE [Ag] § 29.04(3), 06(3)(a) (1982). The standards provide:
Standards for issuing permits; general.
Permits may be issued under this section only when, in the judgment of
the department, adequate controls can be established to assure that the
pesticide will be used with relative safety and without unreasonable hazard
to persons, property, wild animals or the environment....
Permit conditions and controls.
(a) The department may impose conditions or limitations on emergency
use permits as necessary to protect persons, property, wild animals or the
environment, including conditions and limitations on the duration of the
permit, the amount of pesticide to be used, the location and size of the
application site where the pesticide may be used, the method of pesticide
application, and the disposal of unused pesticides and pesticide containers.
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regulations promulgated under FIFRA closely and bear a re-
markable similarity to each other. While the extent of inclusion
in each catetory varies somewhat, most state regulations govern
the certification of private applicators and of commercial appli-
cators, with the latter group being divided into such subcatego-
ries as agricultural pest control, forest pest control, ornamental
and turf pest control, and right-of-way pest control.247
As noted previously, the theory inherent in this type of
regulatory control is that a trained applicator will apply pesti-
cides properly and wisely. Examinations, as defined in the reg-
ulations, are intended to assure a minimum level of competency.
For private applicators, the standard for testing seems to be
quite general, seldom referring to drift directly. The most rele-
vant provision commonly found in state rules in this regard
parallels the federal provision previously quoted requiring ability
to recognize special local environmental situations.248 As to com-
mercial applicators, reference to drift is often made, and state
rules tend to follow the federal language requiring knowledge of
"prevention of drift."24 9 Subcategories of commercial applica-
tors are often more specific, particularly those dealing with
agricultural, forestry, aerial, ornamental and turf, and related
applications.2 10
217 See, e.g., HAwAI REG. § 4-66-57 to -58 (1981); Mo. ADMIN. CODE § 70-25.110,
.150.
" See note 76 supra and accompanying text. 302 KAR 31:005, § 9 (1980) is the
source of the quotation, but the language is virtually identical to the majority of other
states. See notes 104-07 supra and accompanying text.
249 See note 77 supra and accompanying text. See also, e.g., VA. REG. 25(b)(1)(vii)
(c) (1980). This is only illustrative of prevalent language; even those rules which do not
mention drift per se still appear to intend drift-related factors to be a significant area
of knowledge.
Arizona rules, illustrative of the majority of states, provide:
1. Agricultural pest control. Practical knowledge is required concern-
ing ... non-target injury and community problems resulting from the
use of restricted use pesticides in agricultural areas.
2. Forest pest control. The Applicator must therefore demonstrate
practical knowledge of control methods which will minimize the possi-
bility of secondary problems such as unintended effects on wildlife.
Proper use of specialized equipment must be demonstrated, especially
as it may relate to meteorological factors and adjacent land use.
3. Ornamental and turf pest control. Applicators shall demonstrate
practical knowledge of ... drift, and persistence beyond the intended
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D. Registration and Classification
Registration is among the areas where agency rules can be
anticipated to have the least impact on the control of drift.25'
Only in a few instances-for example, California252 and Massa-
chusetts-are drift related factors mentioned in agency rules
regarding registration. Massachusetts's criteria for registration
and classification require that consideration be given to the risk
"of contaminating non-target organisms and thereby causing
acute, chronic, delayed or secondary adverse effects" and to the
"extent to which ingredients or break-down products have the
potential to move from the target area. '25 3 Maine has also used
its registration process to consider environmental data and as a
tool to impose conditions on registration.25 4
Although some agencies do use registration to consider drift,
classification as a restricted or general use pesticide is more often
the focal point for reviewing the effect on the environment. The
state definitions support this view. Hawaii, for example, includes
in its standards for restricted use pesticides the following descrip-
tion: "Pesticides or pesticide uses which can reasonably be an-
ticipated to result in significant population reductions in non-
target organisms or fatal to members of endangered species. ' 255
In another vein, Montana classifies according to anticipated
residue levels and data such as LD50 for the product.2 5 6 Using
criteria such as these to limit the use of a product to certified
period of pest control.
6. Right-of-way pest control. Applicators shall demonstrate practical
knowledge of . . . problems of runoff, drift, and excessive foliage
destruction and ability to recognize target organisms. They shall also
demonstrate practical knowledge of the nature of herbicides and the
need for containment of these pesticides within the right-of-way area,
and the impact of their application activities in the adjacent areas and
communities.
ARIZ. ADMIN. ComI'. § R3-10-57 (1983).
21 See generally notes 93-96 supra and accompanying text.
'1 See CAnF. ADm N. CODE tit. 3, §§ 2360, 2367, 2369.5 (1982).
' MAss. ADmiN. CODE tit. 333, § 8.05(4)(c)(12)-(13) (1983).
See generally ME. REG. 01-001, ch. 51 (1981) (captan); ME. REG. 01-026, ch.
(unnumbered) (1981) (trichlorfon dylox).
-" HAWAII REG. § 4-66-32(b)(3) (1981). See also MONT. ADMIN. R. § 4.10.702, .703
(1980).
2 MONT. ADMN. R. § 4.10.703 (1980).
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applicators or to other restricted situations is a potentially effec-
tive way to control the likelihood of misapplication.
E. Enforcement-Related Activities
The various agency regulations falling under this heading
cover a wide range, from those that are self-policing to those
that involve policing by inspection or monitoring by the state.
Perhaps the most direct effort at self-policing is represented
by the West Virginia regulation requiring utility owners to in-
spect their own application sites. 2 7 More typical of self-policing
are the many state agency regulations which require recordkeep-
ing. While almost all state agencies require some sort of record-
keeping, particularly by commercial applicators, some focus on
certain activities which are apt to call the applicators' attention
to drift and its control. In addition to the routine requirements
for records of time, date, place and "accidents," 215s several states
require records to be kept of wind speed and direction at time
of application, 2 9 and a few require note to be made of adjacent
properties or even of equipment used. 260 While such records
ultimately are open to state inspection, it seems their predomi-
nant value is in increasing applicator awareness.
A midpoint between self policing or government policing is
represented by the requirements in some states that certain pest-
icide applications be carried out only after inspection of some
sort-for example, by university personnel2 6' or consistent with
the written recommendation of qualified professionals. 262
27 See W. VA. REG. ch. 19, § 32 (1981). Compare DivisioN OF PESncmEs, supra
note 219, at § 3 (prespray inspection).
21 See, e.g., COLO. PESTICIDE ACT REG. VI; CAL. ADMN. CODE tit. 3, § 6634
(1982); IND. PESTICIDE USE LAW REG. 4 (1976); N.Y. REG. § 325.25 (1977).
29 See, e.g., ARK. R G. § 4.8(a) (1977); D.C. REG. No. 15 (1978); IDAHO REG. §
4.B(7) (1981); IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 30-10.26(206)(7)(1977); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 4-13-
5(7) (1983); MD. ADMIn. CODE § 15.05.01.11.A(11)-(12) (1976); Miss. LICENSING OF
AGRUCULTURAL AIRCRAFT REG. § 17 (1980); N.M. Pesticide Control Act Regulatory
Order No. 5, § 8(a)(5) (1979), N.M. Pesticide Control Act Regulatory Order No. 9, §
11(e) (1980); OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 901:5-11-07 (1977).
210 See, e.g., ARK. REG. § 4.8(h) (1977) (crops); MIss. APPLICATION OF HORMONE-
TYPE HERBICIDES BY AIRCRAFT RaGULATIONS § 8 (1974) (adjoining property/crops).
26 See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. § 4.10.901 (1982) (endrin); WASH. ADIN. CODE R.
16-228-245(2)(a) (1983) (endrin).
261 See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 6656 (1982). These people or other
consultants may themselves be subject to license requirements. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD &
AGRIc. CODE §§ 12001, 12054 (1971). See also Amuz. ADIn. Colsp. R. § R3-10-80
(1983); LA. PESTICIDE LAW REG. §§ 9.0-10.3; MD. REG. § 15.05.01.06 (1976).
[Vol. 73
CHEMICAL TRESPASS
Beyond recordkeeping and required advice, there are several
aspects of government enforcement that are addressed by agency
rules. Inspection itself is a key enforcement tool. The authori-
zation for, or presence of, government officials at a spray site
may tend to make applicators more aware and careful. Inspec-
tion is also crucial if liability is to be ascertained and damages
or penalties assessed. Almost all state agencies have rules to
implement inspection authority.263 Of most relevance to drift are
those rules which deal with site inspection and the taking of on-
site and off-target samples for residue analysis.
This last aspect of enforcement, the power to inspect, is to
a large extent only relevant to the ability to use the information
found or observed. This aspect of enforcement confirms the
relevance of the whole issue of detectable residues. Most agency
rules do not pursue this issue to any meaningful conclusion. A
few agencies govern tolerances of pesticides, primarily in regard
to food and feed.264 As an enforcement tool, there is apparently
a difficult line to be drawn. As technology has improved, the
ability to detect smaller and smaller amounts of pesticide has
increased, causing some extreme limitations. In some instances,
like New Hampshire's "zero drift" interpretation of its rules or
the similar standard now proposed for Vermont, drift seems to
be governed at the "no detectable residue" level. In other states,
drift is governed by more generic standards-such as "damage,"
"contamination" or "significant harm"-none of which are
particularly precise.
Because of the variety and complexity involved in setting
rational standards, this definitional part of the regulatory process
is difficult to come to terms with. California provides some
guidance, not in its enforcement section, but in its registration
and renewal requirements where it imposes on applicants the
obligation to provide data relevant to residue standards. 265 This
provision suggests that one approach to setting appropriate res-
21 See, e.g., ALA. REG. § 16(A) (1978).
2"' See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 2490.1 (1982); FLA. ADMIN. CODE 5E-2.04
(1981). A comprehensive study of food tolerances/residues was not undertaken. These
appear to follow the food and drug tolerances. For further information, see DIGEST,
supra note 22.
2 In prescribing the data requirements, California rules do provide for a continued
registration pending development of information as necessary. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 3, §§ 2360, 2367, 2369.5 (1982).
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idue levels for enforcement may be to have the manufacturers
come forward with recommendations or supporting data as part
of the registration or classification process. Even so, the "level"
instigating enforcement activity remains an unanswered question
of enforcement.
CONCLUSION
The preceding review shows that pesticide drift is a matter
of serious concern in legislatures and courts throughout the
country. While the issue has merited much attention, it is clear
that there is no consistent or single answer to the concern en-
gendered by the fact that pesticide drift cannot be completely
eliminated or controlled. It is noteworthy that the EPA, which
has the opportunity to adopt uniform federal performance stand-
ards to control drift throughout the country, has declined to do
so, choosing instead to rely largely on general label precautions
or prohibitions.
The use of pesticides is diverse: in product composition, in
regard to target crops and the types of organisms likely to be
found adjacent to them, in prevailing methods of application,
and in regard to population densities and societal concerns in
the areas where the products are used. Because of the wide scope
of variation, it is particularly appropriate that in the absence of
a clear federal direction, the states have fashioned a variety of
answers reflective of the nature of the problems encountered in
a particular region of the country. The preceding overview should
provide state legislators with an understanding of the approaches
taken to deal with the issue of drift. While one state may well
provide a model for another, it can be anticipated that each will
continue to fashion its approach to drift to suit home conditions.
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